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Tax Misperception and Its Effects on Decision Making 
– a Literature Review 
 
Abstract 
Previous accounting research shows that taxes affect decision making by 
individuals and firms. Most studies assume that agents have accurate per-
ception regarding their tax burden. However, there is a growing body of 
literature analyzing whether taxes are indeed perceived correctly. We re-
view 124 studies on the measurement of tax misperception and its behav-
ioral implications. The review reveals that many taxpayers have substantial 
tax misperceptions that lead to biased decision making. We develop a Be-
havioral Taxpayer Response Model on the impact of provided tax infor-
mation on tax perception. Besides individual traits, characteristics of the tax 
information and the decision environment determine the extent of tax mis-
perception. We discuss opportunities for future research and methodologi-
cal limitations. While there is much evidence on tax misperception at the 
individual level, we hardly find any research at the firm level. Little is 
known about the real effects of managers’ tax misperception and on how 
tax information is strategically managed to impact stakeholders. This re-
search gap is surprising as a large part of the accounting literature analyzes 
decision making and disclosure of firms. We recommend a mixed-method 
approach combining experiments, surveys, and archival data analyses to im-
prove the knowledge on tax misperception and its consequences. 
 
Keywords: Behavioral Taxation; Business Taxation, Misperception, Real 
Effects, Tax Perception; Tax Policy 
JEL: M41 · H24 · H25 · D91 
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1 Introduction 
In this paper, we review and evaluate the research on tax misperception and its effects on 
decision making. Previous accounting research provides evidence that taxes significantly 
influence decision making including decisions on investment and financing. Most of this 
work is based on the assumption that individual and firm decision makers can build rational 
expectations about the tax consequences of their choices. However, taxation is highly com-
plex, taxes are often not salient, and in many cases agent behavior is influenced by framing 
effects. It is therefore unclear whether economic agents understand the tax consequences 
of their decisions. With the rise of behavioral economics in the last two decades, tax re-
searchers have also intensified their work on tax misperception and its effect on economic 
decisions. This study aims to review this research from its beginnings in the late 1950s to 
the present. 
In total, we present and discuss 124 mainly empirical studies that measure the 
extent of misperception regarding the income, wealth, and excise tax in different coun-
tries, or examine the effects of tax misperception on taxpayers’ decision making. In the 
literature, different terms are used for what we refer to as misperception. Some authors 
use ‘misconception’ and others ‘biased beliefs’. We consider all of these terms synony-
mous and in the following uniformly refer to ‘misperception’. 
The reviewed studies which measure individuals’ tax perception by surveying tax-
payers reveal substantial tax misperception. However, findings on the degree and the di-
rection (under- versus overestimation) of misperception are inconclusive, and it remains 
unclear where the differences originate. Another shortcoming of these studies is that they 
do not analyze behavioral effects of tax misperception. In contrast to research on individ-
uals’ tax misperception in several countries, studies on firms are scarce and cross-country 
studies do not exist at all. Also, the role of tax-related accounting information on 
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individual and corporate tax misperception and its impact on decision making is under-
explored. This research gap is surprising as much of the literature in accounting and fi-
nance analyzes decision making of firms. 
Further, we review a body of mainly experimental literature on tax perception and 
behavioral response. Studies in this field show that even if accurate tax information is 
provided, taxpayers often do not incorporate taxes into their decision making in a way 
predicted by rational choice theory. It is also shown that misperception of tax facts, e.g. 
due to tax complexity or lack of salience, results in distorted decisions. A potential weak-
ness of these real effects studies is that they do not identify tax misperception directly. 
Rather, they identify tax misperception via behavioral response and infer that these re-
sponses are induced by tax misperception.  
Finally, we review studies that deal with the management of other’s tax percep-
tion. There are few studies, but they indicate that corporate tax information is strategically 
managed to impact stakeholders’ perception. 
To develop well-targeted tax regulations and understand the underlying biases of 
taxpayers, both tax misperception and its implications need to be explored carefully. In 
doing so, the following two questions have to be addressed: (1) Do economic agents mis-
perceive taxes? (2) Do these misperceptions translate into distorted decisions? 
In sum, our study contributes to tax-related accounting research in three ways. 
First, we provide the first comprehensive overview of research on tax misperception and 
its effects on individual and corporate decisions including the management of tax 
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perception.2 In the appendix, we provide one summary table each for Section 3 (Tax Mis-
perception), 4 (Effects of Tax Misperception on Decision Making) and 5 (Management 
of Tax Perception and its Impact on Stakeholders). These tables present the methodology, 
research question, and results of the reviewed articles and enable researchers to quickly 
assess the respective topics and approaches. Second, based on our review of prior re-
search, we develop a Behavioral Taxpayer Response Model that illustrates the impact of 
the type and character of provided tax information on tax perception, whether and how 
the non-tax environment and individual traits moderate this relationship, and how the 
resulting tax perception translates into decisions. The model helps researchers to develop 
and define their own research questions and to derive behavioral predictions. Third, we 
discuss methodological challenges of the research stream and identify research gaps and 
avenues for future research. 
Identifying and scrutinizing misperception and behavioral responses to tax infor-
mation by individuals including entrepreneurs and corporate managers not only contrib-
utes to tax research, it also provides novel insights for related fields in accounting re-
search, such as real effect studies with respect to all kinds of accounting information. 
Thus, we contribute to the sender-receiver paradigm of accounting information and how 
information that is processed and perceived by receivers translates into real effects. Stake-
holders’ exposure to biased and unbiased accounting information and their respective re-
sponses to voluntarily and mandatory disclosed information on firms and compensations 
is also likely to be distorted because of cognitive and behavioral aspects when processing 
                                               
2  The only other related literature review we are aware of is Fochmann, Kiesewetter, Blaufus, 
Hundsdoerfer, and Weimann (2010). However, they focus only on six specific strands of the litera-
ture: (1) perception of marginal tax rates, (2) influence of tax complexity on tax perception, (3) tax-
ation and work incentives, (4) tax salience, (5) tax morale and fairness and (6) money illusion. Strands 
(5) and (6) are not included in our study. As far as there is an overlap in (1) to (4), we expand and 
update the study considerably. Moreover, we explicitly exclude behavioral research on tax compli-
ance (see for a review, e.g., Kirchler, 2007 and Alm, 2019). 
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this information or due to misperception of the regulatory environment. Real effect stud-
ies will benefit from our study by a deeper understanding of potential misperception and 
further behavioral frictions. 
2 Selection Strategy and Overview 
The survey is based on a literature search in the databases EBSCO, JSTOR, ScienceDirect, 
and Google Scholar. The survey consists of three parts. In Section 3, we focus on studies 
that identify tax misperception of both individuals and corporations by asking taxpayers 
directly about their tax perception. To provide overview of these studies, in our queries we 
use keyword combinations of perception (‘assessment’, ‘beliefs’, ‘bias’, ‘misconception’, 
‘misperception’, ‘perception’, ‘salience’) and the tax type (‘capital tax’, ‘corporate tax’, 
‘estate tax’, ‘excise tax’, ‘income tax’, ‘inheritance tax’, ‘property tax’, ‘sales tax’, ‘value 
added tax’, ‘VAT’, ‘wealth tax’). Moreover, to search studies on perception of tax-related 
accounting information, we use keyword combinations of perception and ‘tax disclosure’, 
‘tax reporting’, ‘tax transparency’, ‘analyst’, ‘investor’, ‘management’, and ‘manager’. In 
Section 4, we review studies that infer tax misperception from observed real behavior. We 
use keyword combinations denoting tax misperception (‘tax bias’, ‘tax misperception’) and 
behavioral decisions (‘avoidance’, ‘consumption’, ‘financing’, ‘investment’, ‘real effort’, 
‘planning’, ‘saving’). Furthermore, we survey studies on corporates’ tax perception man-
agement in Section 5. We use keyword combinations of ‘tax’ and ‘disclosure’, ‘discretion’, 
‘media’, ‘political costs’, ‘transparency’, and ‘reporting’. This search strategy results in a 
total set of about 430 papers. 
After selecting studies with a clear focus on identification of tax misperception 
and its effect on decision making or tax perception management, we obtain a final set of 
124 mainly empirical studies (Section 3: 54 studies, Section 4: 62 studies and Section 5: 
14 studies). Table 1 lists all surveyed studies grouped by methodology over time. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697982
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<Insert Table 1 about here> 
Interestingly, although research on tax misperception began more than sixty years 
ago, the majority of studies date from after 2000. As in other economic areas, this is due 
to the increasing importance of behavioral economics in tax research in the last two dec-
ades. Moreover, Table 1 reveals that most studies that identify tax misperception use a 
survey design, real effect studies use an experimental approach, and studies on tax per-
ception management analyse archival data. 
3 Tax Misperception 
3.1 Individual Tax Misperception 
Many studies measure individuals’ misperception by asking respondents to estimate in-
come tax burdens and benchmarking reported against actual numbers. Measuring tax bur-
den misperception encompasses three aspects. 
First, researchers have to decide on the kind of tax burden of interest. If one studies 
people’s attitudes towards the fairness aspects of taxation, the average tax burden or av-
erage tax rate (ATR) is relevant. If the tax burden on additional income is of interest, 
which is particularly relevant for decision making, the marginal tax burden or marginal 
tax rate (MTR) matters.  
Second, the scope of tax burden has to be determined. Is it respondents’ own tax 
burden or that of other taxpayers? In the latter case benchmarking is easy, since the actual 
tax burden can be precisely determined based on income figures provided to respondents. 
By contrast, benchmarking respondents’ own tax burden is more challenging. Using re-
spondents’ tax return data is regarded as the ‘gold standard’ (Gideon, 2014, p. 1). How-
ever, as this data is often not available the actual tax burden has to be calculated based on 
income reported by respondents. Moreover, even if tax return data were available, it 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697982
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would only contain backward-looking information, while forward-looking information is 
necessary for decision making.  
Third, the distribution of misperceptions has to be analyzed. What is the share of 
respondents who over- or underestimate tax burdens and how many respondents are not 
able to give estimates at all?  
3.1.1 Perception of Average Income Tax Rates (ATRs) 
‘ATR studies’ aim, in particular, to identify the effect of misperception on taxpayers’ 
attitudes towards the fairness and distributional implications of the tax system. The ma-
jority of these studies is interested in respondents’ own tax burden. Schmölders (1960) 
pioneered this field.3 Using benchmarks that rely on reported incomes, he finds that about 
one third of respondents report accurate tax burdens. For the others, overestimates con-
siderably outnumber underestimates. The percentage of overestimates is particularly high 
among farmers, freelancers and sole proprietors (>50%) compared to civil servants (35%) 
and employees (40%). Enrick (1963, 1964) uses benchmarks based on tax return infor-
mation and finds that only about 5% of respondents rate their tax burden accurately. The 
others tend to underestimate rather than overestimate their tax bill. van Wagstaff (1965) 
uses employer payroll records for benchmarking and reports a substantial dispersion of 
respondents’ estimates, whereby under- and overestimates are almost balanced. 13% of 
respondents accurately assess their tax burden. Auld (1979) uses reported income for 
benchmarking and finds that low-income respondents overestimate, higher-income re-
spondents underestimate and middle-income respondents almost accurately estimate their 
tax burden. Gideon (2014, 2017) uses reported income for benchmarking and shows, on 
average, an overestimation of ATRs across the income distribution. Ballard and Gupta 
                                               
3  The original study by Schmölders is only available in German. However, some parts of his work on 
fiscal psychology have been translated into English (Schmölders, 2006). 
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(2018) also benchmarked based on reported income and found that over 20% of respond-
ents do not know their ATR. The vast majority of the remaining respondents overstate 
their ATR; the variety of misperceptions is extremely pronounced. 
Three papers focus on misperception of ATRs for different income levels. Wil-
liamson (1976) shows that respondents, on average, significantly overestimate ATRs for 
each given income category. Overestimates und underestimates for low and high incomes 
differ according to respondents’ income. Blaufus et al. (2015) provide evidence that 
nearly 50% of respondents report accurate ATRs. The remainder misperceive ATRs sig-
nificantly, with ATRs for high (low) income underestimated (overestimated). Rees-Jones 
and Taubinsky (2019) show that respondents overestimate ATRs on average and perceive 
the tax schedule to be more linear than it actually is. However, there are also many re-
spondents who underestimate ATRs. 
In sum, the discussed papers show that a significant number of taxpayers are not 
able to accurately estimate either their own ATR or the ATR of other income levels. 
Moreover, most studies indicate a tendency to overstate the ATR, on average, although 
the direction of misperception seems to depend on the income level. 
3.1.2 Perception of Marginal Income Tax Rates (MTRs) 
Not surprisingly, beliefs about MTRs have been examined more often, reflecting that the 
main focus of tax research is on the tax effects on decision making. Gensemer, Lean, and 
Neenan (1965) pioneered this field. They focus on MTRs of high-income earners and es-
tablish benchmark MTRs based on reported income. They provide evidence that more than 
a quarter of respondents are not aware of their MTRs but do not provide further information 
on the extent or direction of MTR misperception. C. V. Brown (1969) derives benchmark 
MTRs from employers’ payroll records and finds that only one fifth of the surveyed work-
ers and nearly one third of the surveyed managers report accurate or roughly accurate 
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MTRs. He observes far more overestimates than underestimates in both groups of respond-
ents. Fujii and Hawley (1988) use reported income to derive benchmark MTRs and find 
that about one third of respondents are not able to guess their MTR. The others underrate 
their MTR, on average, only slightly. Further information such as the share of respondents 
over- or underestimating their MTR is not provided. Rupert and Fischer (1995) use tax 
return information for benchmarking and ask respondents for absolute numbers rather than 
percentages. Over 90% of respondents report misperceived MTRs, with overestimation 
twice as common as underestimation. Gemmell, Morrissey, and Pinar (2003, 2004) do not 
ask respondents to give precise MTR estimates but to select one out of five given ‘additional 
tax burden classes’ and benchmark the responses based on reported income. Due to this 
rather rough measure, it is not surprising that the authors report a rather high level of accu-
rate estimates at over 30%. The remaining respondents exhibit a bias towards an overesti-
mate although many respondents report underestimates, too. Hundsdoerfer and Sichtmann 
(2009) explore a subject pool of practicing physicians. They compare the mean of MTRs 
reported to the corresponding average MTR calculated on the data of the official German 
income tax statistics and find both numbers are equivalent. However, an in-depth analysis 
shows that about one quarter of participants report MTRs that do not exist. Gideon (2014, 
2017) benchmarks against MTRs computed on reported income and finds fairly accurate 
reported MTRs, at the mean, but estimates exhibit substantial heterogeneity. Individuals at 
lower income levels overestimate their MTR, whereas higher-income individuals underes-
timate MTR. Blaufus et al. (2015) use reported income for benchmarking and demonstrate 
that respondents misperceive their MTR more than their ATR. Moreover, taxpayers tend to 
underestimate (overestimate) the MTR for higher (lower) income levels. One in six re-
spondents mistakes ATRs for MTRs. The widespread use of ATRs instead of MTRs is also 
confirmed by Bartolome (1995) in an experimental setting. Similar, Rees-Jones and 
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Taubinsky (2019) find that taxpayers use their ATR rather than their MTR.4 
Lewis (1978) is, to the best of our knowledge, the only study on the perception of 
other individuals’ MTR, finding a uniform underestimate by about 10% for each income 
bracket and less misperception for MTRs that are close to respondents’ income bracket. 
Approximately 10% of respondents fail to provide MTR estimates at all. 
There is also some literature on misperception of income tax progressivity. Slem-
rod (2006) shows that the majority of respondents favor switching to a flat-rate income 
tax because they misperceive the current system being regressive.5 Gideon (2014, 2017) 
finds that only slightly more than one fifth of respondents understand tax schedule pro-
gressivity to mean that MTRs are higher than ATRs. Rees-Jones and Taubinsky (2019) 
show that progressivity in the U.S. income tax code is underestimated since the perceived 
income tax schedule is more linear than the actual schedule. 
In sum, similar to the findings regarding ATR perception, research shows that 
many taxpayers do not know their own MTR and that for other income levels. Over- as 
well as underestimations of the MTR are observed which tend to depend on the income 
level. Moreover, some taxpayers mistake ATRs for MTRs which leads to an underesti-
mation of the MTR given a progressive tax schedule.  
3.1.3 Perception of Other Taxes 
While most of the literature focuses on income tax misperception, there is also some evi-
dence for other taxes. One example is the U.S. estate tax. The frequently cited studies by 
Bartels (2005) and Slemrod (2006) refer to a survey in which half of respondents state that 
they believe ‘most families’ are hit by the estate tax. In fact, at best only about 2% of all 
                                               
4  Using average instead of marginal figures is not tax specific (see Shin (1985) for electricity demand 
and Faulhaber and Baumol (1988) for pricing decisions). 
5  However, beliefs on tax evasion among high-income individuals (Bakija & Slemrod, 2004, p. 69, 
provide evidence for the existence of these beliefs) proved to be not statistically significant. 
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deaths actually led to an estate tax liability. Similar results are found by Kuziemko, Norton, 
Saez, and Stantcheva (2015), Sides (2016) and Chirvi and Schneider (2019). For Germany, 
Bischoff and Kusa (2019) show that 51% of respondents wrongly believe that a child who 
inherits € 100,000 has to pay inheritance tax. 
Cabral and Hoxby (2012) analyze the salience of the U.S. property tax and show 
that homeowners with tax escrow perceive their property tax less accurately than those 
who write property tax checks to local government. However, the share of those who 
under- and overestimate is similar in both groups of homeowners. 
Regarding excise taxes, a survey by TNS Opinion & Social (2015) demonstrates 
that only 65% of individuals in the EU are aware of the standard VAT rate in their coun-
try. Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) as well as Taubinsky and Rees-Jones (2018) find 
similar results for the U.S. Ferber (1954) finds a rather inaccurate perception of changes 
in excise taxes on theatre tickets, cars, luggage, shoes, and refrigerators. For the U.K., 
Gemmell et al. (2003, 2004) analyze how individuals perceive the extra burden on house-
hold expenses that results from a one percentage point increase in the VAT rate and find 
that respondents tend to overestimate the additional burden.  
Fisher and Wassmer (2017) show that respondents overestimate the gasoline tax 
and hence the gasoline tax burden of an average driver in their respective state. Related 
to Cabral and Hoxby (2012) on different property tax payment channels, Finkelstein 
(2009) finds that car drivers who pay their road tolls in cash, on average, perceive toll 
payments significantly more accurately than electronic toll collection users.  
In sum, this section shows that tax misperception is not limited to income taxes 
but is also substantial in regard to other taxes such as consumption and wealth taxes. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697982
 
 11 
3.2 Corporate Tax Misperception 
In contrast to studies on individuals, research on corporations’ tax perception is scarce.6 
Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff (2017) provide evidence that corporate managers 
confuse average and marginal corporate tax rates in decision making. The authors ask tax 
executives of U.S. corporations on the primary tax rate they use in various business deci-
sions and let the participants choose from ‘(1) U.S. statutory tax rate (STR), (2) GAAP 
effective tax rate (ETR), (3) jurisdiction-specific statutory tax rate, (4) jurisdiction-specific 
effective tax rate, (5) marginal tax rate, and (6) other’ (p. 3139). The most frequent answer 
of private firms is ‘U.S. statutory tax rate’ (34.1%), whereas public firms most frequently 
report ‘GAAP effective tax rate’ (27.4%). Only 12.5% (10.8%) of private (public) firms 
use the MTR, which is appropriate for decision-making.  
Several studies examine whether corporate managers, investors, and financial an-
alysts perceive tax-related accounting information accurately. Financial reporting is 
aimed at improving the information environment and reducing misperception. However, 
tax accounting rules are complex and require an understanding of both tax law and finan-
cial accounting. Thus, processing tax-related information is costly and it is therefore rea-
sonable that misperception of tax-related accounting information might occur. 
Bratten, Gleason, Larocque, and Mills (2017) study misperception of tax-related 
accounting information and find that the accuracy of managers’ ETR forecasts decreases 
when GAAP ETRs include discrete items (e.g., transitory gains and losses or settlements 
with tax authorities) or when tax rate complexity (capturing absolute changes in ETR, the 
absolute difference between the statutory tax rate and the ETR, and ETR volatility) is 
                                               
6  Some earlier studies written in German are at least loosely linked to tax perception. These studies 
find that the majority of surveyed German corporations do not properly incorporate taxes in their 
investment decisions (Hüsing, 1999; Kling, 1992; Schwenk, 2003; Wittmann, 1986). A closely re-
lated study by Dietrich, Kiesewetter, and Moosmann (2008) analyzes how Swedish firms perceive 
the tax burden associated with foreign direct investments (FDI) in Austria relative to Germany. 
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high. Moreover, Gleason, Mills, and Nessa (2018) demonstrate that managers’ estimates 
of additional tax liabilities due to tax audits are, on average, inaccurate. 
Research regarding tax misperception of financial analysts has identified signifi-
cant errors in forecasts in face of changes in tax law or tax accounting standards. Plumlee 
(2003) finds that the magnitude of errors in ETR forecasts increases with the complexity 
of tax law changes. K. C. W. Chen, Danielson, and Schoderbek (2003) report that a one-
time deferred tax adjustment (due to an increase in the corporate tax rate) is incorrectly 
interpreted as a recurring item. Hoopes (2018) find increasing earnings forecasts errors 
when a temporary R&D tax credit regulation expires. Brushwood, Johnston, Kutcher, and 
Stekelberg (2019) show that the early adoption of a new rule on tax accounting of stock-
based compensation reduces the accuracy of analysts’ ETR forecasts. In addition, re-
search indicates that analysts make more errors in forecasting earnings of firms with tax 
loss carryforwards (Amir & Sougiannis, 1999) or with high book-tax differences (D. P. 
Weber, 2009). Also, they less accurately forecast tax expenses, pre-tax earnings and ETRs 
when the reported ETR includes discrete items or when tax rate complexity is high (Brat-
ten et al., 2017). Finally, analysts' ETR forecasts are more accurate for firms that present 
ETR reconciliation information in percentage format rather than in dollar format (Chy-
chyla, Falsetta, & Ramnath, 2017). Overall, this research demonstrates significant tax 
misperception by financial analysts. On average, forecasting tax-related information 
seems to be more difficult for analysts than forecasting other accounting information, as 
shown by Kim, Schmidt, and Wentland (2020). However, Bratten et al. (2017) show that 
analysts’ ETR forecasts are more accurate than managers’ forecasts if tax rate complexity 
is high.  
Although financial analysts also suffer from tax misperception, there is evidence 
that their forecasts may still help investors to better incorporate tax-related information. 
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Investors seem to misperceive value-relevant information reflected in tax expense items 
and therefore underreact to information on tax expense surprises (Thomas & Zhang, 
2011). However, this mispricing of income tax expense is reduced if tax expense forecasts 
of analysts are available (Baik, Kim, Morton, & Roh, 2016). 
While many countries have recently adopted policies to increase corporate tax 
transparency, it is unclear whether this has improved the accuracy of tax perception. For 
example, Gleason et al. (2018) find that the introduction of FIN 48, a US GAAP regula-
tion that requires businesses to disclose income tax risks, does not improve managers’ 
forecasts regarding necessary tax reserves, it at least improves the comparability of tax-
related accounting information. However, Robinson, Stomberg, and Towery (2016) show 
that firms are over-reserved for uncertain tax positions after the introduction of FIN 48, 
and that FIN 48 reduces the relevance of tax-related accounting information. Research on 
IFRIC 23 (an IFRS regulation that serves a similar purpose as FIN 48 and is mandatory 
since 2019) is to the best of our knowledge not yet available.  
Another example of recent policies to increase corporate tax transparency is (pub-
lic) country-by-country reporting (CbCR). Several studies investigate both public and 
non-public CbCR and its real effects (R. J. Brown, 2018; Dutt, Ludwig, Nicolay, Vay, & 
Voget, 2019; Eberhartinger, Speitmann, & Sureth-Sloane, 2020; Joshi, Outslay, & 
Persson, 2020; Overesch & Wolff, 2017; Simone & Olbert, 2019). While it is known that 
the information disclosed through CbCR is potentially misleading (Lagarden, Schreiber, 
Simons, & Sureth-Sloane, 2020) none of these studies scrutinizes the extend to which 
misperception impedes transparency and generates undesired implications. 
Finally, research on misperception of tax-related accounting information reveals 
a link to research on tax uncertainty (e.g., Dyreng, Hanlon, & Maydew, 2019; Hanlon, 
Maydew, & Saavedra, 2017; Jacob & Schütt, 2020; Jacob, Wentland, & Wentland, 2019). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697982
 
 14 
Making accurate estimates of uncertain tax items is a challenge yet crucial for decision 
making. In archival studies, tax uncertainty is often measured by ETR volatility (for an 
overview of such tax risk measures, see, e.g., Blouin, 2014). Increasing ETR volatility is 
positively associated with forecast errors of tax-related accounting information (Bratten 
et al., 2017). Thus, tax uncertainty may be another source of tax misperception. In addi-
tion, tax misperception caused, for example, by tax complexity may be another reason for 
more perceived tax uncertainty by investors. In line with this reasoning, Bratten et al. 
(2017) find that complexity increases the dispersion of analysts’ ETR forecasts, and fore-
cast dispersion is commonly interpreted as reflecting uncertainty. Hoppe, Schanz, Sturm, 
and Sureth-Sloane (2019) provide a measure of perceived tax complexity in the tax code 
and framework as faced by multinational corporations. Their survey-based multi-dimen-
sional Tax Complexity Index captures tax uncertainty as one dimension of perceived tax 
complexity.  
In sum, the discussed papers show that corporate tax misperception seems a prev-
alent phenomenon. However, research on corporations’ genuine tax misperception is 
scarce. In addition to the provisions of tax law, tax-related accounting disclosures may 
also induce tax misperception, especially if tax uncertainty and complexity are high. 
4 Effects of Tax Misperception on Decision Making 
4.1 Effects of Individual Tax Misperception on Decision Making 
The previous section has shown that many taxpayers misperceive their own tax burden. 
This section surveys the growing body of research on Behavioral Taxation that deals ex-
plicitly with the behavioral effects of tax misperception.  
4.1.1 Tax Misperception, Investment Decisions, and Risk-Taking 
To examine effects of tax misperception on investment and risk-taking, most researchers 
rely on lab experiments. Unless otherwise stated below, the presented studies do too. 
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First, studies show that tax misperception and its effects on investment depend on 
tax salience and tax complexity. Bartolome (1995) is one of the first to study the effect of 
tax misperception on investment decisions. He finds many individuals using the ATR ‘as 
if’ it were the MTR and thus make wrong investment decisions. Rupert and Wright (1998) 
add that with increasing salience of the MTR subjects make significantly better invest-
ment decisions and learn more rapidly. Rupert, Single, and Wright (2003) find that sub-
jects do not adjust their estimates of the MTR to account for the effects of floors and 
phase-outs. Thus, tax base complexity increases the probability of erroneous investment 
decisions. Boylan and Frischmann (2006) demonstrate that tax-related decision errors in-
crease in tax complexity and diminish over time but do not entirely disappear in compet-
itive markets. Boylan (2013) examines the effects of heterogeneous tax information 
among market participants. He finds that in lab markets in which only a subset of indi-
viduals know the applicable tax rate, the economic benefits generated by the investment 
of these individuals spill over to their uninformed counterparts. 
Second, tax aversion (taxes are disliked more than equivalent costs) may result in 
tax misperception and thus affect investment behavior, yet the evidence is mixed. In line 
with the expected tax aversion, Sussman and Olivola (2011) provide survey evidence that 
participants prefer tax-exempt bonds over equally profitable bonds that are subject to tax, 
while Blaufus and Möhlmann (2014) find in lab markets that the word ‘taxes’ induces a 
higher equilibrium return on traded debt securities. However, over the course of the ex-
periment the premium disappears, suggesting that tax aversion is not a stable preference 
but is instead based on a decision heuristic that individuals re-evaluate in repetitive 
choices. By contrast, using a survey-based conjoint analysis, Hundsdoerfer and Sicht-
mann (2009) show that German physicians overweigh tax considerations in investment 
decisions but that this tax misperception is not associated with tax aversion. Fochmann 
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and Kleinstück (2014) also study the effect of tax aversion on investment decisions in an 
individual choice setting, but do not find any evidence of tax aversion. 
Third, prior literature investigates the impact of tax misperception on risky invest-
ments. Ackermann, Fochmann, and Mihm (2013) as well as Fochmann and Hemmerich 
(2018) find that the willingness to engage in risky investments decreases when an income 
tax has to be paid, although net income is identical in all their treatments. Altough the 
reasons for this have not yet been fully clarified, the findings indicate that taxes induce 
additional complexity and thus increase subjects’ perception of investment risk. Reducing 
the decision complexity by reducing the number of future states reduces the perception 
bias. This corresponds to the results of Abeler and Jäger (2015) who find that background 
complexity affects tax misperception in a real-effort setting. However, opposite results 
are observed with respect to tax loss-offsets. Subjects that decide between net-equivalent 
risky lotteries seem to overestimate the risk reduction effect of tax loss-offsets, so that 
taxes could also increase risk appetite in cases involving a higher probability of loss 
(Fochmann, Hemmerich, & Kiesewetter, 2016; Fochmann, Kiesewetter, & Sadrieh, 
2012b, 2012a). The effect of tax rate misperception on risk taking is examined in Blaufus 
and Möhlmann (2016) who compare the effect of a wealth tax and a net equivalent income 
tax on risk-taking. They find greater risk taking in the presence of a wealth tax, which 
they explain with misperceived ‘low’ wealth tax rate. Möhlmann (2013) demonstrate that 
subjects invest in riskier portfolios in case of a foreign tax rather than a domestic tax on 
foreign dividend income. This shows that sentiment towards different tax collectors af-
fects decision making. Using prospect theory (Kahnemann & Tversky, 1979), researchers 
have derived and/or tested tax effects on risk taking that deviate from rational choice 
predictions. Hlouskova and Tsigaris (2012) theoretically analyze the effect of a propor-
tional capital income tax on portfolio decisions and show that tax-induced reactions 
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depend on the reference point. Falsetta, Rupert, and Wright (2013) experimentally show 
that taxpayers invest more (less) in a riskier asset when a tax decrease (increase) is im-
plemented gradually rather than in one go. In a similar vein, Falsetta and Tuttle (2011) 
examine how expecting a tax refund or an additional tax payment affects investment de-
cisions that themselves do not have any tax consequences. They find in an experiment 
that subjects entitled to claim a tax refund take significantly less risk than those who have 
to pay an additional tax. The influence of tax rate changes on the timing of risky invest-
ments as well as entry and exit flexibility is studied by Fahr, Janssen, and Sureth (2014). 
An exit option seems irrelevant for investment timing in the case of an experienced tax 
rate decrease, but not in the case of a tax rate increase. Building on the utility-based in-
vestment model in Fochmann and Jacob (2015), Mehrmann and Sureth-Sloane (2017) 
derive prospect theoretical tax effects on risk-taking. They determine tax effects biased 
by risk and loss aversion for different loss offset restrictions. Fochmann et al. (2016) and 
Fochmann, Hewig, Kiesewetter, and Schüßler (2017) experimentally examine the effect 
of emotions on risk-taking. Fochmann et al. (2016) show that the more pleasant and less 
exciting a tax treatment is perceived to be, the greater the risky investment. Fochmann et 
al. (2017) provide evidence that investors do not change their risk-taking behavior as a 
direct consequence of changing tax rules, yet do in response to the affective perception 
of these different tax rules.  
4.1.2 Tax Misperception and Financing Decisions 
To the best of our knowledge, the only study on the effect of tax misperception on financing 
decisions is, Blaufus and Möhlmann (2014). They find in a lab experiment that the cost of 
debt includes a tax aversion premium, i.e., the cost of debt is higher than the ‘rational’ value 
and higher as in a treatment where the term ‘transaction cost’ is used instead of ‘tax’. How-
ever, this tax aversion bias disappears in the course of the course of the experiment due to 
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learning effects.  
4.1.3 Tax Misperception and Real Effort 
Using household survey data, studies estimate a tax perception parameter from regressions 
that explain reported work effort using pre-tax and after-tax wage income as determinants. 
The results are heterogeneous. Rosen (1976a), Rosen (1976b) and Brännäs and Karlsson 
(1996) find that the marginal tax rate is accurately perceived by taxpayers. By contrast, 
König, Laisney, Lechner, and Pohlmeier (1995) find an underestimation while Arrazola, 
Hevia, and Sanz (2000) show an overestimation of the MTR.  
Another strand of literature is based on lab experiments. Hayashi, Nakamura, and 
Gamage (2013) find that subjects in net-equivalent treatments are less willing to work 
both when their wages are partitioned with positive (bonus) and with negative surcharge 
(tax) components. They explain this result with subjects’ complexity aversion. By con-
trast, Fochmann, Weimann, Blaufus, Hundsdoerfer, and Kiesewetter (2013) demonstrate 
that subjects work more if their wage is subject to income tax than when they receive a 
net-equivalent tax-free wage. A similar finding regarding work intensity is shown by Dja-
nali and Sheehan-Connor (2012). The positive effect of taxes on real effort remains sig-
nificant for high tax rates such as 50%, however the effect size decreases (Fochmann et 
al., 2013).7 
The effects of complexity-induced tax misperception on work effort are studied in 
Sielaff and Wolf (2016), who find that the combination of multiple interdependent taxes 
reduces working time and work performance. Abeler and Jäger (2015) find that subjects 
                                               
7  The reason for this positive effect is not well understood. One explanation is tax misperception be-
cause subjects take the gross wage as an anchor and integrate tax burdens incompletely or even not 
at all (anchor heuristics, Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). An alternative explanation provided by Dja-
nali and Sheehan-Connor (2012) is the pro-social behavior of individuals. Moreover, under the gift-
exchange theory (Akerlof, 1982) workers are assumed to respond to high wage levels by increasing 
their effort due to positive reciprocity. Thus, even if subjects perceive the wage taxes correctly, they 
could positively reciprocate employers’ higher gross wages by increasing their effort.  
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in a complex decision environment take their previous real-effort decision as a reference 
point and do not adjust their decisions as much in response to new taxes as subjects in a 
simple decision environment. Their results point away from a rational inattention expla-
nation because subjects are as likely to ignore large tax rate changes as they are to ignore 
small changes in a complex environment. Rather, the results suggest that individuals can 
only pay attention to a certain amount of information.  
Further experiments show that tax salience has a significant effect on real effort. 
Blumkin, Ruffle, and Ganun (2012) demonstrate that the lower salience of a consumption 
tax leads to greater real effort than an economically equivalent income tax. Fochmann 
and Weimann (2013) graphically illustrate a progressive income tax schedule to show 
that an increase in tax salience reduces real effort of experimental subjects. Moreover, M. 
Weber and Schram (2017) provide evidence that real effort is lower when an income tax 
is levied on the employer side instead of the employee side.  
Finally, Kessler and Norton (2016) highlight another channel through which de-
viations from ’rational‘ tax perception affect real effort. They provide evidence that sub-
jects are significantly more likely to work less when a decrease in net wage is due to a 
tax rather than due to a wage cut. The authors explain this with tax aversion.  
4.1.4 Tax Misperception and Tax Planning 
There are relatively few studies that explicitly study the effect of tax misperception on tax 
planning.8 Blaufus, Bob, Hundsdoerfer, Kiesewetter, and Weimann (2013) provide lab ex-
perimental evidence that subjects deciding on different tax options overweight the nominal 
                                               
8  Tax misperception may also affect tax evasion since the tax rate is a standard determinant in tax 
evasion models (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). Thus, less-salient taxes should reduce non-compliance 
(Watrin & Ullmann, 2008). Moreover, tax misperceptions also affect perceived tax fairness, another 
determinant of tax compliance (Kirchler, 2007). While there are tax compliance studies on the effect 
of misperceived tax audit probabilities, we are not aware of studies that directly address the effect of 
tax rate misperception on tax evasion (for a recent review of tax compliance research see Alm, 2019). 
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tax rate and underweight tax base extensions. Other studies show that surprisingly many 
people do not take advantage of obvious tax planning opportunities (Alstadsæter & Jacob, 
2017; Goupille-Lebret & Infante, 2018; Kopczuk, 2007; Stephens Jr & Ward-Batts, 2004). 
Although it is not fully clear what ultimately triggers forgoing tax planning opportunities, 
from a behavioral perspective, this might be explained by the lack of visibility of tax plan-
ning options for many economic agents.  
4.1.5 Tax Misperception, Consumption, and Retirement Savings 
The effect of tax misperception on consumption decisions is shown in several (survey) ex-
periments. The effect of tax aversion on consumption has been studied in Sussman and 
Olivola (2011) who show that people are willing to drive or stand in line longer for a tax-
related versus a tax-unrelated discount. However, a recent replication study only partly con-
firms these results (Olsen, Kogler, Brandt, Dezső, & Kirchler, 2019). With respect to tax 
salience, Chetty et al. (2009), Goldin and Homonoff (2013), Taubinsky and Rees-Jones 
(2018), and Feldman, Goldin, and Homonoff (2018) find that posting tax-inclusive prices 
reduces consumption. Whether this effect is clearly due to tax salience and/or a confirma-
tion bias (consumers neglect information that does not align with their consumption inten-
tions) is, however, not fully clear (Feldman et al., 2018; Feldman & Ruffle, 2015). With 
respect to the framing of tax reductions, Epley, Mak, and Idson (2006) provide lab experi-
mental evidence that subjects spend more if a tax reduction is framed as a bonus instead of 
a tax rebate. Similarly, Lozza, Carrera, and Bosio (2010) find in a survey experiment that 
tax reductions framed as an increase in monthly income lead to more spending than if they 
are framed as a reduction in the monthly tax burden. The behavioral effect of the timing of 
taxation on consumption is mixed. In line with the assumption that individuals use mental 
accounting (Thaler, 1990), Chambers and Spencer (2008) find in a survey experiment that 
tax refunds delivered in monthly amounts stimulate current spending more than if the same 
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yearly total tax reduction were delivered in one lump-sum payment. However, using U.S. 
survey data, Sahm, Shapiro, and Slemrod (2012) find a reduction in monthly withholding 
tax to increase spending less than a one-time payment. 
Most countries use special tax regimes to promote retirement savings via a de-
ferred taxation of pensions which makes savings tax deductible, interest on savings tax 
exempt, and pensions fully taxable. However, Chetty, Friedman, Leth-Petersen, Nielsen, 
and Olsen (2014) study tax return data and find that 85% of individuals are ‘passive sav-
ers’ who are unresponsive to subsidies. Using administrative firm data, Beshears, Choi, 
Laibson, and Madrian (2017) find that retirement savings are almost insensitive to the 
introduction of differently taxed retirement plans. Their supplemental survey results sug-
gest that many employees are unaware of the tax treatment being applied to their savings. 
Thus, due to tax ignorance, subjects have lower effective savings under deferred than 
under immediate taxation. The lab experiments of Blaufus and Milde (2020) show that 
providing informational tax nudges reduces tax misperception and closes the savings gap 
between immediate and deferred taxed pension plans. Moreover, replacing the tax de-
ductibility of retirement savings with government-matching contributions raises after-tax 
pensions above the level under immediate taxation without the need to provide informa-
tional tax nudges. The effect of tax complexity on employees’ decisions on company 
pension plans is studied in Blaufus and Ortlieb (2009). Using a survey-based conjoint 
analysis, the authors find that with increasing tax complexity, the proportion of subjects 
who base their decision on their after-tax return decreases significantly. 
Summing up, Section 4.1 reveals that even if subjects have access to objective tax 
information, this information is often misperceived, leading to behavior that systemati-
cally deviates from rational choice predictions. This misperception is particularly pro-
nounced when tax complexity is high and tax salience is low. Further, loss and tax 
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aversion seem to explain these behavioral deviations. Moreover, tax framing and timing, 
too, affect misperception and thus individual decision-making.  
4.2 Effects of Corporate Tax Misperception on Decision Making 
Studies that particularly address the effect of tax misperception on corporate decision mak-
ing are rare. Graham et al. (2017) combine survey data with balance sheet and capital mar-
ket data to study the effect of corporate managers’ tax misperception on investment and 
capital structure decisions. They find that many tax managers, in particular those working 
in public firms, use the GAAP ETR instead of the correct MTR for decision making. More-
over, the results suggest that as the difference between a firm’s MTR and GAAP ETR in-
creases, firms that use the GAAP ETR become less responsive to growth opportunities and 
adopt a suboptimal debt policy. This study is the first to provide evidence of an association 
between tax rate misperception and investment as well as financing inefficiency on a cor-
porate level. It complements the experimental findings for individuals discussed in Section 
4.1 by demonstrating that even in competitive markets and with professional decision mak-
ers, tax misperception may occur and thus inefficient investment and financing decisions 
are made.  
Amberger, Eberhartinger, and Kasper (2016) use lab experiments to study 
whether subjects make tax-optimal corporate intra-group financing decisions. In line with 
Blaufus et al. (2013), they find that subjects under time-pressure overweight tax rate in-
formation and underweight tax base information. This holds for both students and highly 
experienced tax professionals. 
Analyzing the usage of tax planning opportunities by corporations, Zwick (2020) 
reveals that only 37% of corporations that could benefit from loss carryback make use of 
this possibility. This indicates a substantial misperception of tax planning opportunities. 
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Moreover, firms differ significantly regarding the speed of tax code learning, with more 
profitable firms learning faster (Bach, 2015). 
5 Management of Tax Perception and its Impact on Stakeholders 
Some studies show that corporations strategically avoid disclosing unpleasant tax infor-
mation to manage stakeholder perception (Akamah, Hope, & Thomas, 2018; Dyreng, 
Hoopes, & Wilde, 2016). Other studies indicate that firms seem to report some tax infor-
mation voluntarily to mitigate negative capital market reactions to missing tax infor-
mation (Balakrishnan, Blouin, & Guay, 2019; N. Chen, Chi, & Shevlin, 2019; Flagmeier 
& Müller, 2019). Demeré, Li, Lisowsky, and Snyder (2019) and Hoopes, Kubata, Wage-
ner, and Watrin (2017) provide empirical evidence that firms smooth their GAAP ETRs. 
Consistently, Flagmeier, Müller, and Sureth-Sloane (2020) find that firms strategically 
disclose information on their GAAP ETR more visibly if their ETR is favorable from an 
investor’s perspective (low or close to the average ratio for firms of the same industry or 
size group). Overall, these findings indicate that firms actively manage investors’ percep-
tion in their tax disclosure strategy. 
Further studies examine management of tax perception with respect to the politi-
cal cost theory. This theory suggests that larger firms are exposed to greater public pres-
sure than smaller firms and thus have higher (reported) ETRs (see e.g., Watts & Zimmer-
man, 1978; Zimmerman, 1983). Higher (reported) ETRs can be both a result of political 
costs and a tool to bias the political process. The latter is relevant in terms of firms striving 
to induce politicians’ or voters’ misperception on firms’ tax burdens. According to Wong 
(1988), the choice of accounting method is linked to the political costs of a firm. He 
demonstrates that larger corporations receiving substantial export tax credits are more 
likely to apply the accounting method that raises their reported ETRs. Northcut and Vines 
(1998) examine ETR reporting prior to the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986. They find that 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697982
 
 24 
firms with low ETRs boosted their reported tax burdens in the year prior to the reform to 
reduce the probability of higher taxes. Similarly, Baloria and Klassen (2017) find that 
corporate tax reform-supporting firms raised their ETRs prior to the 2012 U.S. election 
to promote candidates who advocated for tax cuts. Moreover, consistent with the political 
cost argument, Chychyla et al. (2017) find that firms with low (high) ETRs tend to high-
light the dollar (percentage) amount of their tax expense. Management of tax perception 
also plays a role in maintaining public contracts. Mills, Nutter, and Schwab (2013) pro-
vide evidence that politically sensitive contractors exhibit higher federal ETRs. While 
Wong (1988) and Northcut and Vines (1998) were able to provide clear evidence that 
higher ETRs result merely from tax perception management, Baloria and Klassen (2017) 
and Mills et al. (2013) cannot disentangle to what degree higher ETRs result from tax 
perception management or from higher tax payments. 
6 Determinants of Tax Misperceptions: Behavioral Taxpayer Response Model 
In this section, we summarize the results of tax perception research by developing a Behav-
ioral Taxpayer Response Model that illustrates the impact of the character of provided tax 
information on tax perception, whether and how the non-tax environment and individual 
traits moderate this relationship and finally, how the emerging tax perception translates into 
decisions. The model should help researchers to develop and define their own research 
questions and derive behavioral predictions. Figure 1 displays the model.  
< Insert Figure 1 about here > 
The prior sections have shown that objective tax information (about tax rates, tax base 
elements, and tax procedures) is not always perceived correctly by information recipients. 
Tax misperception exists because many subjects behave in a rationally bounded manner. 
They consider that purely rational choices are costly to operate in both time and cognitive 
strain (Simon, 1959). However, there is no single theory that explains bounded rational 
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tax responses. Rather, several approaches coexist in behavioral economics and are em-
ployed by tax researchers. These approaches encompass the assumption that individuals 
use simplifying decision heuristics, are systematically subject to certain perception and 
decision biases, have no standard-preferences, or are rationally inattentive. 
Important heurists that drive tax misperception are the following. First, using the 
ironing heuristic, taxpayers linearize the tax schedule for all levels of income using their 
own ATR. Thus, ironers rely on a proportional tax rate schedule where their ATR deter-
mines both the overall ATR and MTR. The ironing hypothesis is supported by Bartolome 
(1995), Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004), Feldman and Katuščák (2006), and Rees-Jones 
and Taubinsky (2019). Second, using the spotlighting heuristic, individuals assume the 
slope of the tax schedule is equal to their own MTR over the entire income range. Lieb-
man and Zeckhauser (2004) and Feldman and Katuščák (2006) provide evidence in sup-
port of the spotlighting heuristic. Third, the use of the anchor heuristic can explain biased 
tax effects on real effort as decision making may depend primarily on pre-tax wages (e.g., 
Fochmann et al., 2013). Fourth, the use of a lexicographic heuristic can explain the ob-
servation that tax rate information is overweighted in comparison to tax base information 
(Blaufus et al., 2013). Fifth, subjects use rounding heuristics in estimating the tax burden 
(Taubinsky & Rees-Jones, 2018). Sixth, subjects use mental accounts to simplify their 
decision making. Thus, tax refunds administered as one lump-sum affect behavior differ-
ently from tax refunds in the same amount that are refunded monthly through reduced 
income tax withholding (Chambers & Spencer, 2008). 
Besides the use of heuristics, research from economic psychology highlights the 
existence of behavioral biases that affect tax misperception. For example, subjects disre-
gard information on sales tax because the additional tax burden contradicts their con-
sumption intention (confirmation bias, Feldman & Ruffle, 2015), or information on 
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income tax rates is overweighted compared to tax base information because tax rate in-
formation is generally more easily available (availability bias, Blaufus et al., 2013). Some 
subjects have a larger disutility from paying taxes than they do if paying the same amount 
of other costs (tax aversion bias, Blaufus & Möhlmann, 2014; Kessler & Norton, 2016; 
Sussman & Olivola, 2011). By contrast, other subjects have non-standard utility functions 
and perceive an additional positive utility from paying taxes to contribute to public goods 
(tax affinity, Djanali & Sheehan-Connor, 2012). Non-standard utility functions may also 
include fairness considerations. If utility functions include fairness preferences, not only 
the perception of one’s own tax burden but also that of others is relevant for decision 
making. Non-standard utility functions further encompass reference-point dependency, 
for example, the different valuation of gains and losses according to prospect theory 
(Kahnemann & Tversky, 1979). Therefore, framing tax reductions as a bonus or rebate 
affects decision making (Epley et al., 2006). 
Finally, there is some evidence that inattention to taxes decreases with the amount 
of the tax. This points towards a rational inattention explanation of tax misperception 
(Amberger et al., 2016; Taubinsky & Rees-Jones, 2018) because information is more 
likely to be incorporated in decision-making if ignoring it is more costly (Abeler & Jäger, 
2015). However, the evidence regarding this issue is inconclusive (Abeler & Jäger, 2015; 
Feldman et al., 2018). 
Because the use of heuristics and the existence of behavioral biases depend on 
individual traits, the properties of tax information, and the characteristics of the general 
decision environment, we distinguish (i) tax information determinants, (ii) individual de-
terminants, and (iii) determinants of the decision environment. In Table 2, we present 
detailed information about these determinants, the operationalizations used in prior re-
search, and the direction of the determinants’ effect on tax misperception. 
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< Insert Table 2 about here > 
First, regarding tax information determinants (Panel A of Table 2), previous re-
search has found that misperception of objective tax facts increases with decreasing sali-
ence (Blumkin et al., 2012; Cabral & Hoxby, 2012; Chetty et al., 2009; Finkelstein, 2009; 
Goldin, 2012; Sausgruber & Tyran, 2005; Taubinsky & Rees-Jones, 2018; M. Weber 
& Schram, 2017). The salience of taxes may depend on who is obliged to pay the tax, on 
whom the tax is levied (direct taxes, indirect taxes, withholding taxes), the payment mech-
anism (individual transfer, electronic collection), and whether taxes are displayed (prices 
with/without sales tax).  
In addition, tax complexity has been shown to increase tax misperception. It re-
duces real effort (Sielaff & Wolf, 2016) and increases the probability of erroneous invest-
ment decisions (Boylan & Frischmann, 2006; Rupert et al., 2003; Rupert & Wright, 
1998). In complex tax systems, many subjects base their decisions on pre-tax variables 
(Blaufus & Ortlieb, 2009). Tax complexity also affects corporate tax misperception. Gra-
ham et al. (2017) report that firms with a large proportion of assets in foreign locations 
(making it very complex to calculate the correct MTR) are less likely to use the MTR for 
decision making. Furthermore, Bratten et al. (2017) find that the accuracy of managers’ 
and analysts’ ETR forecasts decreases when tax rate complexity is high. 
Tax framing is another tax information determinant that affects decision making. 
Empirical results suggest that the label ’tax‘ itself may be negatively perceived by tax 
averse individuals and that changing the label of a tax affects its perceived burden (e.g., 
Hundsdoerfer, Sielaff, Blaufus, Kiesewetter, & Weimann, 2013, Kessler & Norton, 2016; 
Löfgren & Nordblom, 2009). Also, the framing of a tax reduction as a bonus instead of a 
rebate seems to influence spending behavior (e.g., Epley et al., 2006). Furthermore, the 
format of tax information affects perception. Normative assessments of tax progressivity 
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differ when expressed in tax rates or in dollar amounts. Tax burdens assigned in dollars 
rather than in tax rates are significantly lower (Hite & Roberts, 1991; McCaffery & Baron, 
2003); subjects presented with ETR information in percentage format make more accu-
rate tax expense forecasts than subjects who are presented with a dollar format (Chychyla 
et al., 2017). 
In addition, tax timing influences tax perception (Chambers & Spencer, 2008; Fal-
setta et al., 2013) when subjects use mental accounts (Thaler, 1990) or have prospect 
theoretical utility functions (Kahnemann & Tversky, 1979). Finally, tax uncertainty may 
increase tax misperceptions (e.g., Bratten et al., 2017). 
Second, to what extent objective tax information is perceived accurately depends 
on a number of individual determinants that moderate the effect of tax information on the 
subjective tax burden and thus on tax-related decision making (Panel B of Table 2). Be-
cause the use of heuristics and the existence of behavioral biases are usually negatively 
associated with knowledge and cognitive capacity, it is not surprising that most studies 
find that tax misperception decrease with better tax knowledge and higher cognitive ca-
pacity. This negative effect on tax misperception has been found for individual taxpayers 
(Blaufus et al., 2015; Gensemer et al., 1965; Gideon, 2014; Slemrod, 2006; Williamson, 
1976), in a corporate context (Alstadsæter & Jacob, 2017; Amberger et al., 2016; Bach, 
2015; Graham et al., 2017) and for financial analysts (D. P. Weber, 2009). 
In addition to tax knowledge and cognitive capacity, a variety of other individual 
moderators determine the perception of tax information. If tax information is in conflict 
with their own behavioral intentions, individuals may ignore or underweigh this infor-
mation due to a confirmation bias (Feldman et al., 2018; Feldman & Ruffle, 2015). Emo-
tions, too, can affect tax perception, particularly in risky investment decisions (Fochmann 
et al., 2016; Fochmann et al., 2017). 
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Other individual traits that have been examined as potential determinants of tax 
misperception include age, gender, ideology, and attitudes towards taxation, income, 
home-ownership, marital status, and self-employment. Most studies find that tax misper-
ception decreases in income due to higher rewards from tax planning, which makes it 
more attractive to learn more about tax laws. Concerning the other mentioned variables, 
the evidence is, however, inconclusive. 
Third, besides characteristics of the tax information and traits of the decision 
maker, the general decision environment also shapes the extent of tax misperception (see 
Panel C of Table 2). If the decision environment is already very complex, the probability 
of additional tax information being misperceived increases (Abeler & Jäger, 2015). More-
over, learning opportunities and competition are important debiasing tools. Firms operat-
ing in environments with greater product market competition are more likely to use the 
correct MTR for decision-making (Graham et al., 2017). Boylan and Frischmann (2006) 
and Blaufus and Möhlmann (2014) show that tax-related decision errors persist, but di-
minish over time in competitive market settings. In repetitive decisions, subjects often 
have the opportunity to learn and reduce tax misperception, which is not possible with 
one-off or irregularly occurring decisions (Blaufus et al., 2013; Blaufus & Milde, 2020; 
Blaufus & Möhlmann, 2014; Rupert & Wright, 1998). Social networks, peers, media at-
tention, and the relationship with the tax authorities also shape the environment that con-
stitute individual beliefs (and managers’ beliefs, McGuire, Omer, & Sharp, 2012) and 
ultimately coin (corporate) taxpayers’ attitude towards taxes and tax planning (Hasan, 
Hoi, Wu, & Zhang, 2017). 
According to rational inattention models, increasing incentives should reduce tax 
misperception. Supporting evidence stems from Goldin and Homonoff (2013), Amberger 
et al. (2016), Graham et al. (2017), and Taubinsky and Rees-Jones (2018). Graham et al. 
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(2017) find that firms are less likely to use the statutory tax rate (STR) instead of the 
correct MTR for decision-making when the difference between the MTR and STR in-
creases. Goldin and Homonoff (2013) show that only low-income consumers respond to 
changes in less salient cigarette taxes. Amberger et al. (2016) observe that the share of 
tax-minimizing decisions increases in the tax burden difference between two options, and 
Taubinsky and Rees-Jones (2018) show that increasing sales tax rates reduce tax misper-
ception. By contrast, Abeler and Jäger (2015) and Feldman et al. (2018) do not find that 
tax misperception decreases with increasing tax rates. 
There is some evidence that time pressure increases tax misperception (Amberger 
et al., 2016) and that the prepayment position matters for tax perception. Taxpayers who 
owe taxes seem to make greater errors in estimating their MTR than those who are entitled 
to a refund (Rupert & Fischer, 1995). Lastly, an uncertain decision environment affects 
tax misperception, too (e.g., Fochmann et al., 2012b, 2012a). 
In a corporate context, two further moderators are relevant to tax misperception. 
First, there seems to be a difference between private and public firms due to differences 
in the salience of tax information. In line with the assumption that the GAAP ETR (STR) 
is particularly salient for managers of public (private) firms, Graham et al. (2017) show 
that public (private) firms are more likely to use the GAAP ETR (STR) instead of the 
correct MTR for decision making. Thus, a capital market focus may favor tax mispercep-
tion due to the concentration on accounting-related tax information (GAAP ETR) instead 
of the decision-relevant MTR. Second, the level of corporate governance and the quality 
of the firm’s information environment reduce tax misperception. Firms with strong insti-
tutional ownership are more likely to use the MTR for decision making (Graham et al., 
2017). Tax related forecasts errors decrease with increasing institutional ownership (Kim 
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et al., 2020) and increasing numbers of analysts following a firm (Kim et al., 2020; D. P. 
Weber, 2009).  
If taxpayers’ subjective tax burden deviates from the objective burden and they 
make their decisions without the help of information intermediaries, tax responses deviate 
from rational choice predictions. However, if subjects follow unbiased advice from their 
employer, investment advisory firms, the media, the tax agency, or professional tax advi-
sors, their own tax misperception does not translate into decision errors.9 Thus, we con-
sider the use of information intermediaries as a moderator of the relationship between tax 
information and behavioral tax responses in the Behavioral Taxpayer Response Model. 
In line with this, Zwick (2020) shows that sophisticated tax preparers reduce non-opti-
mizing tax decisions of corporations. 
In sum, the presented model shows that tax misperception is a function of specific 
individual traits, tax information characteristics, and properties of the decision environ-
ment. Moreover, whether tax misperception translates into tax-related decision errors de-
pends on the availability and use of unbiased tax advice. 
7 Open Research Questions  
Each section of our review has revealed several open research issues. Regarding individual 
and corporate tax misperception (Section 3), we observe that researchers use different ap-
proaches to measure tax misperception but there is no research that compares these ap-
proaches with respect to the extent of measured tax misperception. Moreover, we are not 
aware of studies that conduct cross-country comparisons, compare misperceptions across 
                                               
9  Unbiased advice could also serve as a source of information and thereby decrease taxpayers’ tax 
misperception. However, prior evidence reveals that using tax preparation assistance is positively 
correlated with tax misperception (Gideon, 2014; Rupert & Fischer, 1995; Ballard & Gupta, 2018). 
This suggests that taxpayers who seek tax advice delegate their tax affairs to experts without building 
up their own expertise. In line with this, research shows that taxpayers seek tax advice even if the 
resulting tax savings are lower than the fees paid to preparers to reduce tax uncertainty and cope with 
the inherent taxcomplexity (Blaufus, Hechtner, & Möhlmann, 2017). 
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different kind of taxes, or directly measure corporate managers’ misperception of tax rates 
or tax burdens.  
With respect to the effects of tax misperception on decision making (Section 4), we 
identify open research issues concerning non-business, business, and corporate decision 
making. While much behavioral tax research focuses on non-business decisions, surpris-
ingly we find almost no research on the effect of tax misperception on typical household 
finance decisions such as housing, the realization of capital gains, or private portfolio deci-
sions. Regarding business decisions, the reviewed research has mainly studied the effect of 
tax misperception on investment and risk-taking decisions. By contrast, there is a dearth of 
research on the effect of tax misperception on other business decisions such as the choice 
of organizational form, employment, financing, location choice, production, supply chain, 
and tax planning. Regarding decision-making of corporate managers, our knowledge is par-
ticularly limited. In addition to the already mentioned business decisions which should also 
be examined on a corporate level, future research should also address how corporate tax 
misperception affects accounting choices, the type and implementation of tax risk manage-
ment systems, usage of tax uncertainty shields, and participation in voluntary co-operative 
tax compliance programs. 
In terms of both the occurrence and magnitude of tax misperception and its impact 
on decision making, there is a research gap regarding the misperception of the tax burden 
of others. Behavioral tax compliance research suggests that there are spill-over effects on 
one’s own economic decisions (e.g., Blaufus, Bob, Otto, & Wolf, 2017; Lefebvre, Pes-
tieau, Riedl, & Villeval, 2015). Meanwhile, studies in accounting have revealed many 
roles of peers in explaining firm behavior (see Bird, Edwards, & Ruchti, 2018 for tax 
planning activities). However, studies on the effect of corporate misperception of peers’ 
tax burden are missing. One could expect these spill-over effects to concern other 
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decisions, too, such as both individual and corporate manager decisions and especially 
real effort, compliance, and investment decisions, yet also decisions on tax planning or 
location choices. 
Another research gap concerns the management of tax misperception by corpora-
tions and its impact on stakeholders (Section 5). For example, we know little about how 
firms manage tax accounting information and its disclosure to influence stakeholders’ 
perception of the firms’ tax burden. Regarding the determinants of tax misperception 
(Section 6), we identify several research questions that encompass the optimal design of 
tax information to reduce tax misperception or to foster investment or savings decisions, 
the determination of firm characteristics that influence tax misperception, the effect of 
incentive schemes on tax misperception, and the effect of information intermediaries on 
tax misperception and tax-related decision errors. We provide a detailed overview of open 
research issues in Table 3. 
<Insert Table 3> 
8 Conclusion 
The surveyed research demonstrates that many taxpayers suffer from substantial tax mis-
perception. They have no accurate knowledge of either their average or their marginal tax 
rate. The estimates for the percentage of taxpayers who largely accurately perceive their 
income tax rate range from under 10% to 44%. Moreover, most studies report that subjects 
overestimate their ATR although the direction of misperception seems to depend on the 
income level. Regarding the MTR, over- and underestimations are observed, with some 
taxpayers (including corporate managers) mistaking ATRs for MTRs, which leads to an 
underestimation of the progressive tax schedule. In addition, even if accurate tax infor-
mation is provided, taxpayers often do not incorporate taxes into their decision making in 
a way predicted by rational choice theory. Thus, tax misperception results from two 
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sources: (i) lack of tax knowledge and (ii) misapplication of tax information in decision 
making. The reason for this tax misperception is that many subjects behave in a rationally 
bounded manner, i.e., they consider that purely rational choices require much time and cog-
nitive effort to operate. To account properly for tax misperception in research, we develop 
the Behavioral Taxpayer Response Model which can be employed for both theoretical and 
empirical research to customize misperception (determinants and effects) for the underly-
ing research question. Based on the assumption of taxpayers’ bounded rationality, this 
model systematizes prior research on the determinants of tax misperception with respect to 
(i) tax information determinants, (ii) individual determinants, and (iii) determinants of the 
decision environment.  
We identify numerous opportunities for future research (see Table 3). The most 
obvious research gap concerns limited knowledge regarding tax misperception of corpo-
rate managers and its effect on corporate decision making. While the results of individual 
choice experiments may be descriptive for small businesses, such as sole proprietorships 
or small corporations, one should be cautious when translating these results directly to 
the context of large corporations with professional tax management. Future research 
should therefore follow and extend the studies of Graham et al. (2017) and Zwick (2020). 
This research gap is surprising, as it is important to understand the sender-receiver para-
digm of tax relevant information both as disclosed by taxpayers and as provided by reg-
ulators and monitoring bodies.  
It is noticeable that previous research offers a variety of different theoretical ex-
planations for tax misperception. However, often the concrete behavioral channel is not 
clearly identified. Instead, most economic studies simply assume a misperception param-
eter but still use a standard neoclassical decision model to explain behavior. Sometimes 
this raises problems in determining whether the observed effect is due to tax 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697982
 
 35 
misperception or due to the wrong specification of the decision model. This holds true 
especially for the effects of tax misperception on real effort, but could also explain the 
inconclusive results concerning the effects on risk taking. Future research therefore needs 
to further improve the identification strategy. Moreover, despite emphasizing the im-
portance of perception heterogeneity, many experiments still determine only average 
treatment effects which often mask heterogeneous tax responses.  
Regarding the applied empirical methodology, we observe a dominance of exper-
imental and survey studies. Due to the high internal validity of experiments, these studies 
allow causal inferences. However, experiments are limited to very simplified tax rules 
and relatively low economic incentives. In particular, accounting researchers could build 
on previous economic tax experiments by adding more institutional details. By contrast, 
surveys allow for collecting data on representative samples but offer lower internal va-
lidity and suffer from a lack of economic incentives. To overcome limitations concerning 
internal or external validity, a mixed-method approach combining surveys, experiments, 
and archival data analyses seems very promising. Thus, we encourage future research to 
pursue this avenue to help substantiate ongoing international tax policy debates and better 
understand the impact of tax misperception on entrepreneurial and corporate decision 
making.  
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Figure 1: Behavioral Taxpayer Response Model 
Notes: This figure illustrates tax misperception in a behavioral tax response model. The model describes the impact of the type and 
character of provided tax information (TAX INFORMATION DETERMINANTS) on tax perception ((SUBJECTIVE) TAX PERCEP-
TION). Also, it captures whether and how the non-tax environment (DETERMINANTS OF THE DECISION ENVIRONMENT) and 
individual traits (INDIVIDUAL DETERMINANTS) moderate this relationship. Finally, the model describes how the resulting tax 
perception translates into decisions (TAX EFFECTS ON DECISION MAKING) and how this translation is moderated by the use of 
information intermediaries (INFORMATION INTERMEDIARIES).  
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Table 1: Studies Grouped by Methodology over Time 
  
before 
1990 
1990- 
1999 
2000- 
2009 
2010 or 
later 
Total 
Tax Misperception  
 Survey 12 3 6 10 31 
 Archival Data Analysis 2 1 5 10 18 
 Non-Incentivized Survey Experiment 0 0 0 3 3 
 Incentivized Survey Experiment 0 0 0 2 2 
 Field Experiment 0 0 1 0 1 
 Lab Experiment 0 1 0 0 1 
 Theoretical Analysis 0 0 0 1 1 
 Total 14 5 12 26 57 
Effects of Tax Misperception on Decision Making  
 Survey 2 2 3 3 10 
 Archival Data Analysis 0 0 2 8 10 
 Non-Incentivized Survey Experiment 0 0 3 4 7 
 Incentivized Survey Experiment 0 0 0 0 0 
 Field Experiment 0 0 2 3 5 
 Lab Experiment 0 2 4 27 33 
 Theoretical Analysis 0 0 0 3 3 
 Total 2 4 14 48 68 
Management of Tax Perception and its Impact on Stakeholders 
 Survey 0 0 0 0 0 
 Archival Data Analysis 3 1 0 10 14 
 Non-Incentivized Survey Experiment 0 0 0 0 0 
 Incentivized Survey Experiment 0 0 0 0 0 
 Field Experiment 0 0 0 0 0 
 Lab Experiment 0 0 0 1 1 
 Theoretical Analysis 1 0 0 0 1 
 Total 4 1 0 11 16 
Notes: This table gives an overview of all 124 surveyed studies. Since some studies use more than one methodology, the number of total stud-
ies does not add up to 124. 
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Table 2: Determinants of Tax Misperceptions 
Panel A: Tax Information Determinants 
Tax complexity  
AICPA’s tax complexity index Plumlee (2003) finds that the magnitude of errors in ETR forecasts increases with the complex-
ity of tax law changes. 
Combination of multiple interde-
pendent taxes 
Increases tax misperception, reduces working time and performance (Sielaff & Wolf, 2016). 
Proportion of assets in foreign lo-
cations 
Firms with a large proportion of their assets in foreign locations are less likely to use the MTR 
for decision-making (Graham et al., 2017). 
Tax Complexity Index (TCI) Hoppe et al. (2019) find that tax framework complexity is negatively associated with countries’ 
governance, suggesting that strongly governed countries show lower levels of tax mispercep-
tion. By contrast, tax code complexity is found to be positively associated with the statutory tax 
rate, indicating that high-tax countries’ tax code could fuel tax misperception. 
Tax rate complexity factor  Bratten et al. (2017) find that the accuracy of managers’ and analysts’ ETR forecasts decreases 
when tax rate complexity (capturing absolute changes in ETR, the absolute difference between 
STR and ETR, and ETR volatility) is high. 
Tax rate information, floors and 
phase-outs 
Increasing tax complexity increases the probability of erroneous investment decisions (Boylan 
& Frischmann, 2006; Rupert et al., 2003; Rupert & Wright, 1998). 
Time needed for understanding the 
tax rules 
With increasing tax complexity, the proportion of subjects that make tax-optimal decision de-
creases significantly (Blaufus & Ortlieb, 2009). 
Tax framing  
Prospect Theory The framing of a tax reduction as a bonus instead of a tax rebate or as increase in monthly 
income instead of a reduction of the monthly tax burden affects spending behavior (e.g., Epley 
et al., 2006). Fahr et al. (2014) find that the presence of an exit option seems to be irrelevant for 
(affects) investment timing in the case of an experienced tax rate decrease (increase). Mehrmann 
and Sureth-Sloane (2017) analytically show that tax loss offset restrictions significantly bias 
investor perception even more heavily than the tax rate.  
Tax labels Different labels for taxes can affect the perceived tax burden (Hundsdoerfer et al., 2013; Löfgren 
& Nordblom, 2009). The label ‘tax’ itself can affect the perceived burden of tax averse subjects 
(Blaufus & Möhlmann, 2014; Kessler & Norton, 2016; Sussman & Olivola, 2011). 
Format of tax information Tax burdens assessed in dollars rather than rates are significantly less progressive (Hite & Rob-
erts, 1991; McCaffery & Baron, 2003) and subjects presented with ETR information in a per-
centage format make more accurate tax expense forecasts than do subjects presented with the 
information in a dollar format (Chychyla et al., 2017). 
Tax salience  
Direct vs. indirect taxes Higher tax misperception for indirect taxes (Blumkin et al., 2012; Sausgruber & Tyran, 2005). 
Graphical illustration of progres-
sive tax schedule 
Reduces tax misperception (Fochmann & Weimann, 2013). 
Payment method Less salient payment methods increase property tax misperception (Cabral & Hoxby, 2012) and 
toll payment misperception (Finkelstein, 2009). Income tax perception depends on whether the 
tax is levied on the employer side or the employee side (M. Weber & Schram, 2017). The point 
of tax collection also affects the economic incidence of tax (Morone, Nemore, & Nuzzo, 2018). 
Tax inclusive vs. exclusive prices Tax inclusive prices reduce demand (Chetty et al., 2009; Goldin, 2012; Taubinsky & Rees-
Jones, 2018). 
Tax timing Tax refunds administered in one lump sum are less likely to be spent than tax monthly refunds 
of the same amount through reduced income tax withholding (Chambers & Spencer, 2008). 
However, this finding is not confirmed by Sahm et al. (2012). 
Falsetta et al. (2013) show that taxpayers invest more (less) in a riskier asset when there is a tax 
decrease (increase) that is implemented gradually rather than all at once. 
Tax uncertainty Increases tax misperception (e.g., Bratten et al., 2017). 
Panel B: Individual determinants 
Behavioral intentions Due to a confirmation bias, consumers neglect tax information that does not align with their 
consumption intentions (Feldman et al., 2018; Feldman & Ruffle, 2015). 
Cognitive capacity  
Education A positive association between education and accuracy of tax perception is demonstrated by 
Gensemer et al. (1965), Williamson (1976), Slemrod (2006), Blaufus et al. (2015), and Am-
berger et al. (2016), while other studies find no statistically significant effect of education (Bal-
lard & Gupta, 2018; Fujii & Hawley, 1988; Gideon, 2014). 
Management ability The speed at which tax planning opportunities are identified correlates with the ability of cor-
porate management to generate higher returns (Bach, 2015). 
Numerical intelligence Decreases ATR misperception, but has no effect on MTR misperception (Gideon, 2014). 
Social class Lewis (1978) finds social class and the accuracy of MTR estimates being positively associated.  
Emotions Fochmann et al. (2016) show that the more pleasant and less exciting a tax treatment is per-
ceived, the higher the risky investment. Fochmann et al. (2017) provide evidence that investors 
do not change their risk taking behavior as a direct consequence of changing tax rules but due 
to the affective perception of these different tax rules. 
Ideology and attitudes towards taxa-
tion, tax aversion 
Lewis (1978) and Slemrod (2006) report no association between political party affiliation and 
tax misperception. Ballard and Gupta (2018) find the same for ideology while Williamson 
(1976) finds weak explanatory power for ideology. Ballard and Gupta (2018) report more pro-
nounced tax rate overestimates by respondents who either regard people like themselves being 
taxed too high or who assume that taxes are spent ineffectively. Sussman and Olivola (2011), 
Blaufus and Möhlmann (2014), Kessler and Norton (2016) show that some individuals dislike 
tax payments more than equivalent costs. Fochmann and Kleinstück (2014) do not find tax 
averse behavior. 
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Tax knowledge  
Accounting education Graham et al. (2017) finds a negative effect for accounting-related education of corporate tax 
managers on tax rate misperception. 
Factual tax questions Slemrod (2006) finds no association between tax knowledge and misperception of tax schedule 
progressivity. 
Firm size, high-R&D-intensity 
firms 
Graham et al. (2017) assume that larger firms and high-R&D-intensity firms are likely to have 
greater tax compliance activities and/or greater tax planning opportunities, which leads them to 
employ well-trained tax personnel. They find that the likelihood of using the MTR for decision-
making (instead of the ETR) increases with firm size and high-R&D-intensity. 
Investment activity Decreases misperception of MTRs (Gensemer et al., 1965) 
Occupation in banking, insurance, 
stock brokerage, and accountancy 
Decreases misperception of MTRs (Gensemer et al., 1965) 
Self-rated familiarity with the fed-
eral income tax rate structure 
In contrast to other studies, Rupert and Fischer (1995) find increasing tax misperception of the 
MTR when subjects state that they have extensive tax knowledge. 
College degree in economics/law, 
having parents who run a business 
Alstadsæter and Jacob (2017) show that having a college degree in economics or law and having 
parents who run a business is positively associated with the use of tax planning options. 
Years of experience as analysts Decreases misperception of tax-related information (D. P. Weber, 2009).  
Tax preparation assistance Using tax preparation assistance is positively correlated with tax rate misperception (Ballard 
& Gupta, 2018; Gideon, 2014; Rupert & Fischer, 1995). 
Other variables  
Age According to Gideon (2014), Ballard and Gupta (2018) and Feldman, Katuščák, and Kawano 
(2016), age is negatively associated with tax misperception, while Lewis (1978) finds more accu-
rate estimates only for middle-aged individuals. By contrast, Blaufus et al. (2015) report more pro-
nounced misperception among elderly people of their MTR and Slemrod (2006) of tax rate sched-
ule progressivity. 
Gender Gender does not play a role in tax misperception, according to Gideon (2014), Ballard and Gupta 
(2018), and Fujii and Hawley (1988). Blaufus et al. (2015) find a gender effect only for overes-
timates, which are more pronounced for men. Slemrod (2006) reports that men underestimate 
tax schedule progressivity far more than women. 
Home ownership While Fujii and Hawley (1988) find a negative association with tax misperception, Ballard and 
Gupta (2018) find no significant association. 
Income A positive association between income and accuracy of estimates is confirmed by Rupert and 
Fischer (1995), Ballard and Gupta (2018), Williamson (1976) and Feldman et al. (2016), 
whereas Blaufus et al. (2015) show income and underestimates of own MTRs to be associated. 
Marital status Slemrod (2006) and Gideon (2014) find no correlation, whereas Ballard and Gupta (2018) indi-
cate more overestimates among married respondents. 
Self-employment Feldman et al. (2016) show that self-employement reduces tax misperception, while Schmölders 
(1960) reports the opposite. Blaufus et al. (2015) find no significant association. 
Use of investment advice Negative correlation with tax misperception (Rupert & Fischer, 1995) 
Panel C: Determinants of the Decision Environment 
Background complexity The initial tax complexity of a decision environment increases misperception of subsequently 
introduced new, simple taxes (Abeler & Jäger, 2015).  
Competition Firms operating in environments with greater product market competition are more likely to use 
the MT (instead of the ETR) for decision making (Graham et al., 2017). Boylan and Frischmann 
(2006) and Blaufus and Möhlmann (2014) show that tax-related decision errors persist in com-
petitive market settings but diminish over time. 
Corporate governance / information environment 
Implementation of XBRL  Reduces analysts’ misperception of tax-based earnings information (Kim et al., 2020). 
Institutional ownership Firms with high institutional ownership are more likely to use the MTR (instead of the ETR) for 
decision-making (Graham et al., 2017). Tax related forecasts errors decrease with increasing 
institutional ownership (Kim et al., 2020). 
No. of analysts following the firm Reduces tax related forecasts errors (Kim et al., 2020; D. P. Weber, 2009).  
Incentives Increasing incentives reduce tax misperception. Firms are less likely to use the STR for decision 
making when the difference between the MTR and STR is larger (Graham et al., 2017). Goldin 
and Homonoff (2013) find that only low-income consumers respond to changes in cigarette 
taxes, Amberger et al. (2016) observe that the share of tax-minimizing decisions increases the 
larger the tax burden difference between two options. Taubinsky and Rees-Jones (2018) show 
that increasing sales tax rates reduce misperception. By contrast, Abeler and Jäger (2015) and 
Feldman et al. (2018) do not find that tax misperception decreases with increasing tax rates. 
Learning opportunities Feedback from other market participants and learning by doing reduce tax-related decision er-
rors/biases (Blaufus et al., 2013; Blaufus & Milde, 2020; Blaufus & Möhlmann, 2014; Boylan 
& Frischmann, 2006; Rupert & Wright, 1998).  
Prepayment position Taxpayers who owe taxes make greater errors in estimating their MTR than those who are enti-
tled to a refund (Rupert & Fischer, 1995).  
Public vs. private firms According to Graham et al. (2017), public (private) firms are more likely to use the ETR (STR) 
instead of the MTR for decision-making, A stronger capital market focus (measured by the 
number of analysts following the firm) increases the likelihood of the ETR (instead of the correct 
MTR) being used for decision making (Graham et al., 2017).  
Time pressure Time pressure increases tax misperception (Amberger et al., 2016). 
Uncertainty Uncertainty related to the decision environment affects tax misperception, for example via loss-
offset misperception (e.g., Fochmann et al., 2012b, 2012a). 
Notes: This table gives an overview of findings on individual and tax information determinants and determinants of the decision environ-
ment. 
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Table 3: Open Research Issues 
1. Individual and corporate tax misperception (occurrence and magnitude) 
G
E
N
E
R
A
L
 • How does the measurement method affect the magnitude of tax misperception? 
• Does tax misperception differ across countries? 
• How does tax misperception differ (direction and magnitude) across different kinds of taxes? 
• Does the misperception of the absolute and relative tax burden (tax burden distribution) vary?  
C
O
R
P
. • To what extent do corporate managers misperceive tax rates? 
• Do corporate managers misperceive different tax rates (ETR vs. MTR) differently? 
• Do corporate managers misperceive the tax burden of their peers? 
2. Effects of tax misperception on decision making 
N
O
N
-B
U
S
IN
E
S
S
 • How does tax misperception affect housing decisions? 
• How does tax misperception affect the realization of capital gains? 
• How does tax misperception affect portfolio selection? 
• What explains the different results regarding tax misperceptions on risk-taking? 
• What behavioral channel explains the positive effect of taxes on real effort despite net equivalent payoffs? 
• How does misperception of peers’ tax burden affect non-business decisions? 
B
U
S
IN
E
S
S
 
• How does tax misperception affect the choice of organizational form? 
• How does tax misperception affect employment decisions? 
• How does tax misperception affect financing decisions? 
• How does tax misperception affect investment decisions? 
• How does tax misperception affect location decisions (within a country and cross-border)? 
• How does tax misperception affect production and supply chain decisions? 
• How does tax misperception affect tax planning decisions? 
• How does misperception of peers’ tax burden affect business decisions? 
C
O
R
P
O
R
A
T
E
 
• How does tax misperception affect employment decisions? 
• How does tax misperception affect investment decisions? 
• How does tax misperception affect financing decisions? 
• How does tax misperception affect location decisions (within a country and cross-border)? 
• How does tax misperception affect payout decisions? 
• How does tax misperception affect production and supply chain decisions? 
• How does tax misperception affect tax planning decisions? 
• How does tax misperception affect the type and implementation of tax risk management systems? 
• How does tax misperception affect usage of tax uncertainty shields (ATR, APA)? 
• How does tax misperception affect participation in voluntary co-operative compliance programs? 
• How does tax misperception of non-profit taxes affect decisions at corporate level (property tax, inheritance tax, excise tax)? 
• How does tax misperception affect tax accounting choices? 
• How does misperception of peers’ tax burden affect corporate decisions? 
3. Management of tax perception and its impact on stakeholders 
 • Can firms exploit consumers’ tax misperception by implementing ‘tax-free’ advertising campaigns? 
• Which forms of information provision do firms use to manage their tax disclosures (texts, graphs, tables, numbers, notes)? 
• Which channels of information provisions do firms use to manage their tax disclosures (annual reports, investor conferences 
and road shows, media, social media)? 
• How do firms manage their tax disclosures to influence their stakeholders (customers, workforce, investors, tax authorities, 
regulatory bodies, politicians)? 
• Which accounting systems do firms use to generate the numbers required by (mandatory) tax reporting (local GAAP, IFRS, 
managerial accounting numbers)? 
• Do firms manage tax misperception via tax expenses (e.g., accruals management) or deferred taxes? 
4. Determinants of tax misperceptions (Behavioral Taxpayer Response Model) 
T
A
X
 I
N
F
O
R
M
A
T
IO
N
 
• How should tax information be designed and distributed to reduce misperception? 
• How should tax disclosures in financial accounting be designed to improve the accuracy of tax perceptions? 
• Do information interventions such as the display of the individual ATR and MTR in tax assessment notes (as is common in 
some countries) improve the accuracy of tax perception? 
• To what extent do increased tax transparency rules (country-by-country reporting, FIN 48/IFRIC 23, DAC6) affect the tax 
misperception of corporate stakeholders (investors, financial analysts, revenue agents, consumers)? 
• What is the relationship between tax uncertainty and tax misperception? 
• What is the relationship between tax code/framework complexity and tax misperception? 
• How should tax incentives to increase retirement savings be designed from a behavioral taxation perspective? 
• How should tax incentives to foster investment be designed from a behavioral taxation perspective? 
IN
D
IV
ID
U
A
L
 
• How does individuals’ or corporate managers’ attitude towards the government affect tax misperceptions (trust, political atti-
tudes, prior experiences with government bodies)? 
• To what extent do tax misperception depend on firm/corporate characteristics? 
E
N
V
IR
O
N
M
E
N
T
 
• To what extent does corporate managers’ tax misperception depend on incentive schemes? 
• To what extent does corporate managers’ tax misperception depend on their relative position and power in the organization? 
• To what extent does corporate managers’ tax misperception depend on being active in industry specific networks (lobbyism)? 
• How does the implementation and kind of tax risk management system affect tax misperception? 
• Is tax misperception during crises any different? 
IN
T
E
R
M
E
D
IA
R
IE
S
 
• Do tax advisors provide biased tax information and what drives the direction and magnitude of biases?  
• Does the use of tax software affect tax misperceptions? 
• Do the media provide biased tax information and what drives the direction and magnitude of biases? 
• Do employers provide accurate tax information? 
• Do investment advisors provide accurate tax information? 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697982
 
 41 
References 
Abeler, J., & Jäger, S. (2015). Complex Tax Incentives. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 
7(3), 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20130137 
Ackermann, H., Fochmann, M., & Mihm, B. (2013). Biased effects of taxes and subsidies on portfolio 
choices. Economics Letters, 120(1), 23–26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.038 
Akamah, H., Hope, O.-K., & Thomas, W. B. (2018). Tax havens and Disclosure Aggregation. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 49(1), 49–69. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-017-0084-x 
Akerlof, G. A. (1982). Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97(4), 
543. https://doi.org/10.2307/1885099 
Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis. Journal of Public 
Economics, 1(3-4), 323–338. https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2 
Alm, J. (2019). What motivates tax compliance? Journal of Economic Surveys, 33(2), 353–388. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12272 
Alstadsæter, A., & Jacob, M. (2017). Who participates in tax avoidance? Evidence from Swedish micro-
data. Applied Economics, 49(28), 2779–2796. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2016.1248285 
Amberger, H., Eberhartinger, E., & Kasper, M. (2016). Tax Rate Biases in Tax Planning Decisions: Exper-
imental Evidence. WU International Taxation Research Paper Series (2016-01). 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2727680 
Amir, E., & Sougiannis, T. (1999). Analysts' Interpretation and Investors' Valuation of Tax Carryforwards. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 16(1), 1–33. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.1999.tb00572.x 
Arrazola, M., Hevia, J. de, & Sanz, J. F. (2000). More on tax perception and labour supply: the Spanish 
case. Economics Letters, 67(1), 15–21. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00253-0 
Auld, D. A. L. (1979). Public Sector Awareness and Preferences in Ontario. Canadian Tax Journal, 27(2), 
172-183. 
Bach, L. (2015). Do better entrepreneurs avoid more taxes? Oxford University Centre for Business Taxa-
tion Working Papers (1517). Retrieved from https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Busi-
ness_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Working_Papers/Series_15/WP1517.pdf  
Baik, B., Kim, K., Morton, R., & Roh, Y. (2016). Analysts’ pre-tax income forecasts and the tax expense 
anomaly. Review of Accounting Studies, 21(2), 559–595. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-016-9349-z 
Bakija, J., & Slemrod, J. (2004). Do the rich flee from high state taxes? Evidence from federal estate tax 
returns. NBER Working Paper (10645). https://doi.org/10.3386/w10645 
Balakrishnan, K., Blouin, J. L., & Guay, W. R. (2019). Tax Aggressiveness and Corporate Transparency. 
The Accounting Review, 94(1), 45–69. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-52130 
Ballard, C. L., & Gupta, S. (2018). Perceptions and Realities of Average Tax Rates in the Federal Income 
Tax: Evidence from Michigan. National Tax Journal, 71(2), 263–294. 
https://doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2018.2.03 
Baloria, V. P., & Klassen, K. J. (2017). Supporting Tax Policy Change Through Accounting Discretion: 
Evidence from the 2012 Elections. Management Science, 64(10), 4893–4914. 
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2842 
Bartels, L. M. (2005). Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind. Per-
spectives on Politics, 3(01), 963. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592705050036 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697982
 
 42 
Bartolome, C. A. M. de (1995). Which tax rate do people use: Average or marginal? Journal of Public 
Economics, 56(1), 79–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(93)01409-4 
Beshears, J., Choi, J. J., Laibson, D., & Madrian, B. C. (2017). Does front-loading taxation increase sav-
ings? Evidence from Roth 401(k) introductions. Journal of Public Economics, 151, 84–95. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.09.007 
Bird, A., Edwards, A., & Ruchti, T. G. (2018). Taxes and Peer Effects. The Accounting Review, 93(5), 97–
117. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-52004 
Bischoff, I., & Kusa, N. (2019). Should Wealth Transfers Be Taxed? Evidence from a Representative Ger-
man Survey. Public Finance Review, 47(4), 635–661. https://doi.org/10.1177/1091142119845862 
Blaufus, K., Bob, J., Hundsdoerfer, J., Kiesewetter, D., & Weimann, J. (2013). Decision heuristics and tax 
perception – An analysis of a tax-cut-cum-base-broadening policy. Journal of Economic Psychology, 
35, 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2012.12.004 
Blaufus, K., Bob, J., Hundsdoerfer, J., Sielaff, C., Kiesewetter, D., & Weimann, J. (2015). Perception of 
income tax rates: evidence from Germany. European Journal of Law and Economics, 40(3), 457–478. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-013-9389-9 
Blaufus, K., Bob, J., Otto, P. E., & Wolf, N. (2017). The effect of tax privacy on tax compliance–An ex-
perimental investigation. European Accounting Review, 26(3), 561–580. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2016.1258319 
Blaufus, K., Hechtner, F., & Möhlmann, A. (2017). The effect of tax preparation expenses for employees: 
evidence from Germany. Contemporary Accounting Research, 34(1), 525–554. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12240 
Blaufus, K., & Milde, M. (2020). Tax Misperceptions and the Effect of Informational Tax Nudges on Re-
tirement Savings. Management Science, forthcoming. 
Blaufus, K., & Möhlmann, A. (2014). Security Returns and Tax Aversion Bias: Behavioral Responses to 
Tax Labels. Journal of Behavioral Finance, 15(1), 56–69. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/15427560.2014.877017 
Blaufus, K., & Möhlmann, A. (2016). Wealth tax and investment risk: An experimental investigation / 
Vermögensteuer und Risikobereitschaft: Eine experimentelle Untersuchung. Die Betriebswirtschaft, 
76(1), 87–102. 
Blaufus, K., & Ortlieb, R. (2009). Is Simple Better? A Conjoint Analysis of the Effects of Tax Complexity 
on Employee Preferences Concerning Company Pension Plans. Schmalenbach Business Review, 61(1), 
60–83. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03396780 
Blouin, J. (2014). Defining and Measuring Tax Planning Aggressiveness. National Tax Journal, 67(4), 
875–900. https://doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2014.4.06 
Blumkin, T., Ruffle, B. J., & Ganun, Y. (2012). Are income and consumption taxes ever really equivalent? 
Evidence from a real-effort experiment with real goods. European Economic Review, 56(6), 1200–1219. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.06.001 
Boylan, S. J. (2013). Who Benefits from Tax Rate Transparency? Evidence from the Laboratory. Journal 
of the American Taxation Association, 35(2), 65–83. https://doi.org/10.2308/atax-50459 
Boylan, S. J., & Frischmann, P. J. (2006). Experimental Evidence on the Role of Tax Complexity in In-
vestment Decisions. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 28(2), 69–88. 
https://doi.org/10.2308/jata.2006.28.2.69 
Brännäs, K., & Karlsson, N. (1996). Estimating the perceived tax scale within a labor supply model. Eco-
nomics Letters, 52(1), 75–79. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(96)00846-4 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697982
 
 43 
Bratten, B., Gleason, C. A., Larocque, S. A., & Mills, L. F. (2017). Forecasting Taxes: New Evidence from 
Analysts. The Accounting Review, 92(3), 1–29. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-51557 
Brown, C. V. (1969). Misconceptions about income tax and incentives. Scottish Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 16(2), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9485.1969.tb00028.x 
Brown, R. J. (2018). Essays at the intersection of taxation and financial accounting (Doctoral dissertation). 
London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom. 
https://doi.org/10.21953/lse.7pbn3ih7vltj 
Brushwood, J., Johnston, D., Kutcher, L., & Stekelberg, J. (2019). Did the FASB's Simplification Initiative 
Increase Errors in Analysts' Implied ETR Forecasts? Evidence from Early Adoption of ASU 2016-09. 
Journal of the American Taxation Association, 41(2), 31–53. https://doi.org/10.2308/atax-52247 
Cabral, M., & Hoxby, C. (2012). The hated property tax: salience, tax rates, and tax revolts. NBER Work-
ing Paper (18514). https://doi.org/10.3386/w18514 
Chambers, V., & Spencer, M. (2008). Does changing the timing of a yearly individual tax refund change 
the amount spent vs. saved? Journal of Economic Psychology, 29(6), 856–862. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2008.04.001 
Chen, K. C. W., Danielson, M. G., & Schoderbek, M. P. (2003). Analysts' Interpretation of Transitory 
Earnings Components: Evidence from Forecast Revisions after Disclosure of the 1993 Deferred Tax 
Adjustment. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 18(3), 333–353. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0148558X0301800303 
Chen, N., Chi, S., & Shevlin, T. J. (2019). A Tale of Two Forecasts: An Analysis of Mandatory and Volun-
tary Effective Tax Rate Forecasts. SSRN Working Paper (3271837). 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3271837 
Chetty, R., Friedman, J. N., Leth-Petersen, S., Nielsen, T. H., & Olsen, T. (2014). Active vs. Passive Deci-
sions and Crowd-Out in Retirement Savings Accounts: Evidence from Denmark  Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 129(3), 1141–1219. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qju013 
Chetty, R., Looney, A., & Kroft, K. (2009). Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence. American Eco-
nomic Review, 99(4), 1145–1177. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.4.1145 
Chirvi, M., & Schneider, C. (2019). Stated Preferences for Capital Taxation - Tax Design. Misinformation 
and the Role of Partisanship. arqus Discussion Paper (242). Retrieved from www.arqus.info/mobile/pa-
per/arqus_242.pdf  
Chychyla, R., Falsetta, D. [D.], & Ramnath, S. (2017). Determinants and Consequences of Presentation 
Format: The Case of ETR Reconciliations. University of Miami. 
Demeré, P., Li, L. Y., Lisowsky, P., & Snyder, R. W. (2019). Do Smoothing Activities Indicate Higher or 
Lower Financial Reporting Quality? Evidence from Effective Tax Rates. SSRN Working Paper 
(2757786). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2757786 
Dietrich, M., Kiesewetter, D., & Moosmann, S. (2008). Schwedische Direktinvestitionen in Deutschland 
und in Österreich - Eine empirische Untersuchung der,,gefühlten Steuerbelastung” Perspektiven Der 
Wirtschaftspolitik, 9(1), 62–82. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2516.2007.00262.x 
Djanali, I., & Sheehan-Connor, D. (2012). Tax affinity hypothesis: Do we really hate paying taxes? Journal 
of Economic Psychology, 33(4), 758–775. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2012.02.004 
Dutt, V. K., Ludwig, C. A., Nicolay, K., Vay, H., & Voget, J. (2019). Increasing tax transparency: investor 
reactions to the country-by-country reporting requirement for EU financial institutions. International 
Tax and Public Finance, 26(6), 1259–1290. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-019-09575-4 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697982
 
 44 
Dyreng, S. D., Hanlon, M., & Maydew, E. L. (2019). When Does Tax Avoidance Result in Tax Uncer-
tainty? The Accounting Review, 94(2), 179–203. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-52198 
Dyreng, S. D., Hoopes, J. L., & Wilde, J. H. (2016). Public Pressure and Corporate Tax Behavior. Journal 
of Accounting Research, 54(1), 147–186. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12101 
Eberhartinger, E., Speitmann, R., & Sureth-Sloane, C. (2020). Real Effects of Public Country-by-Country 
Reporting and the Firm Structure of European Banks. Advance online publication. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3523909 
Enrick, N. L. (1963). A Pilot Study of Income Tax Conciousness. National Tax Journal, 16(2), 169 -173. 
Enrick, N. L. (1964). A further Study of Income Tax Conciousness. National Tax Journal, 17(3), 319-321. 
Epley, N., Mak, D., & Idson, L. C. (2006). Bonus of rebate?: the impact of income framing on spending 
and saving. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19(3), 213–227. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.519 
Fahr, R., Janssen, E., & Sureth, C. (2014). Can Tax Rate Increases Foster Investment Under Entry and Exit 
Flexibility? - Insights from an Economic Experiment. WU International Taxation Research Paper Series 
(2014-05). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2442721 
Falsetta, D. [Diana], Rupert, T. J., & Wright, A. M. (2013). The Effect of the Timing and Direction of Cap-
ital Gain Tax Changes on Investment in Risky Assets. The Accounting Review, 88(2), 499–520. 
https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-50319 
Falsetta, D. [Diana], & Tuttle, B. (2011). Transferring Risk Preferences from Taxes to Investments Con-
temporary Accounting Research, 28(2), 472–486. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01048.x 
Faulhaber, G. R., & Baumol, W. J. (1988). Economists as Innovators: Practical Products of Theoretical 
Research. Journal of Economic Literature, 26(2), 577–600. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/sta-
ble/2726363 
Feldman, N. E., Goldin, J., & Homonoff, T. (2018). Raising the Stakes: Experimental Evidence on the En-
dogeneity of Taxpayer Mistakes. National Tax Journal, 71(2), 201–230. 
https://doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2018.2.01 
Feldman, N. E., & Katuščák, P. (2006). Should the average tax rate be marginalized? CERGE-EI Working 
Paper Series (304). Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publica-
tion/4809541_Should_the_Average_Tax_Rate_Be_Marginalized  
Feldman, N. E., Katuščák, P., & Kawano, L. (2016). Taxpayer Confusion: Evidence from the Child Tax 
Credit. American Economic Review, 106(3), 807–835. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20131189 
Feldman, N. E., & Ruffle, B. J. (2015). The Impact of Including, Adding, and Subtracting a Tax on De-
mand. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 7(1), 95–118. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20130101 
Ferber, R. (1954). How aware are consumers of excise tax changes? National Tax Journal, 7(4), 355–358. 
Finkelstein, A. (2009). E-ZTAX : Tax Salience and Tax Rates. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(3), 
969–1010. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2009.124.3.969 
Fisher, R. C., & Wassmer, R. W. (2017). Does Perception of Gas Tax Paid Influence Support for Funding 
Highway Improvements? Public Finance Review, 45(4), 511–537. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1091142116660189 
Flagmeier, V., & Müller, J. (2019). Tax loss carryforward disclosure and uncertainty. arqus Discussion 
Paper (208). https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-749 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697982
 
 45 
Flagmeier, V., Müller, J., & Sureth-Sloane, C. (2020). When do firms highlight their effective tax rate? 
TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series (37). 
https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3693374 
Fochmann, M., & Hemmerich, K. (2018). Income Taxes and Risky Investment Decisions: An Experiment 
on Behavioral Tax Biases. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 174(4), 651–688. 
https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2018-0002 
Fochmann, M., Hemmerich, K., & Kiesewetter, D. (2016). Intrinsic and extrinsic effects on behavioral tax 
biases in risky investment decisions. Journal of Economic Psychology, 56, 218–231. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2016.07.003 
Fochmann, M., Hewig, J., Kiesewetter, D., & Schüßler, K. (2017). Affective reactions influence invest-
ment decisions: evidence from a laboratory experiment with taxation. Journal of Business Economics, 
87(6), 779–808. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-016-0838-0 
Fochmann, M., & Jacob, M. (2015). A Utility-Based Explanation of Tax Asymmetries. World Tax Journal, 
7(3), 329–342. 
Fochmann, M., Kiesewetter, D., Blaufus, K., Hundsdoerfer, J., & Weimann, J. (2010). Tax Perception - an 
empirical survey. arqus Discussion Paper (99). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1707443 
Fochmann, M., Kiesewetter, D., & Sadrieh, A. (2012a). The biased effect of aggregated and disaggregated 
income taxation on investment decisions. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 168(3), 
519–545. https://doi.org/10.1628/093245612802920944 
Fochmann, M., Kiesewetter, D., & Sadrieh, A. (2012b). Investment behavior and the biased perception of 
limited loss deduction in income taxation. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 81(1), 230–
242. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.10.014 
Fochmann, M., & Kleinstück, A. (2014). Tax Aversion: Are we really willing to accept a reduced income 
only to save on taxes? Die Betriebswirtschaft, 74(4), 249. 
Fochmann, M., & Weimann, J. (2013). The effects of tax salience and tax experience on individual work 
efforts in a framed field experiment. FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, 69(4), 511–542. 
https://doi.org/10.1628/001522113X675692 
Fochmann, M., Weimann, J., Blaufus, K., Hundsdoerfer, J., & Kiesewetter, D. (2013). Net Wage Illusion 
in a Real-Effort Experiment. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 115(2), 476–484. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12007 
Fujii, E. T., & Hawley, C. B. (1988). On the Accuracy of Tax Perceptions. The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 70(2), 344. https://doi.org/10.2307/1928321 
Gemmell, N., Morrissey, O., & Pinar, A. (2003). Tax perceptions and the demand for public expenditure: 
evidence from UK micro-data. European Journal of Political Economy, 19(4), 793–816. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(03)00037-5 
Gemmell, N., Morrissey, O., & Pinar, A. (2004). Tax Perceptions and Preferences Over Tax Structure in 
the United Kingdom. The Economic Journal, 114(493), F117-F138. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0013-
0133.2004.00190.x 
Gensemer, B. L., Lean, J. A., & Neenan, W. B. (1965). Awareness of marginal income tax rates among 
high-income taxpayers. National Tax Journal, 18(3), 258–267. 
Gideon, M. (2014). Survey measurement of income tax rates (Doctoral dissertation). The University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. Retrieved from https://pdfs.seman-
ticscholar.org/3006/42d2b540d4dec5217edd295b14f7b7a02eee.pdf  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697982
 
 46 
Gideon, M. (2017). Do Individuals Perceive Income Tax Rates Correctly? Public Finance Review, 45(1), 
97–117. https://doi.org/10.1177/1091142115615670 
Gleason, C. A., Mills, L. F., & Nessa, M. L. (2018). Does FIN 48 Improve Firms' Estimates of Tax Re-
serves? Contemporary Accounting Research, 35(3), 1395–1429. https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-
3846.12320 
Goldin, J. (2012). Sales Tax Not Included: Designing Commodity Taxes for Inattentive Consumers. Yale 
Law Journal, 122(1), 258–301. 
Goldin, J., & Homonoff, T. (2013). Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Cigarette Tax Salience and Regressivity. 
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 5(1), 302–336. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.5.1.302 
Goupille-Lebret, J., & Infante, J. (2018). Behavioral responses to inheritance tax: Evidence from notches 
in France. Journal of Public Economics, 168, 21–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.09.016 
Graham, J. R., Hanlon, M., Shevlin, T., & Shroff, N. (2017). Tax Rates and Corporate Decision-making. 
The Review of Financial Studies, 30(9), 3128–3175. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhx037 
Hanlon, M., Maydew, E. L., & Saavedra, D. (2017). The taxman cometh: Does tax uncertainty affect cor-
porate cash holdings? Review of Accounting Studies, 22(3), 1198–1228. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-
017-9398-y 
Hasan, I., Hoi, C.-K. S., Wu, Q., & Zhang, H. A.O. (2017). Does Social Capital Matter in Corporate Deci-
sions? Evidence from Corporate Tax Avoidance. Journal of Accounting Research, 55(3), 629–668. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12159 
Hayashi, A. T., Nakamura, B. K., & Gamage, D. (2013). Experimental Evidence of Tax Salience and the 
Labor–Leisure Decision:Anchoring, Tax Aversion, or Complexity? Public Finance Review, 41(2), 203–
226. https://doi.org/10.1177/1091142112460726 
Hite, P. A., & Roberts, M. L. (1991). An Experimental Investigation of Taxpayer Judgments on Rate Struc-
ture in the Individual Income Tax System. The Journal of the American Taxation Association, 13(2), 
47–63. 
Hlouskova, J., & Tsigaris, P. (2012). Capital income taxation and risk taking under prospect theory. Inter-
national Tax and Public Finance, 19(4), 554–573. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-012-9224-1 
Hoopes, J. L. (2018). The Effect of Temporary Tax Laws on Understanding and Predicting Corporate 
Earnings. SSRN Working Paper (2671935). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2671935 
Hoopes, J. L., Kubata, A., Wagener, T., & Watrin, C. (2017). Round and Steady: An Investigation of GAAP 
ETR Management. Working Paper.  
Hoppe, T., Schanz, D., Sturm, S., & Sureth-Sloane, C. (2019). Measuring Tax Complexity Across Coun-
tries: A Survey Study on MNCs (No. 5). TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series 
(5). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3469663 
Hundsdoerfer, J., & Sichtmann, C. (2009). The importance of taxes in entrepreneurial decisions: an analysis 
of practicing physicians’ behavior. Review of Managerial Science, 3(1), 19–40. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-008-0023-0 
Hundsdoerfer, J., Sielaff, C., Blaufus, K., Kiesewetter, D., & Weimann, J. (2013). The influence of tax la-
beling and tax earmarking on the willingness to contribute - A conjoint analysis. Schmalenbach Busi-
ness Review, 65(4), 359–377. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03396862 
Hüsing, S. (1999). Subjektive Steuerwirkungen und ihre Implikationen für die Betriebswirtschaftliche Steu-
erlehre: Ein interdisziplinärer Ansatz. Forschungsergebnisse aus dem Revisionswesen und der be-
triebswirtschaftlichen Steuerlehre: Vol. 17. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697982
 
 47 
Jacob, M., & Schütt, H. H. (2020). Firm Valuation and the Uncertainty of Future Tax Avoidance. European 
Accounting Review, 29(3), 409–435. https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2019.1642775 
Jacob, M., Wentland, K., & Wentland, S. (2019). Real Effects of Tax Uncertainty: Evidence from Firm 
Capital Investments. SSRN Working Paper (2518243). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2518243 
Joshi, P., Outslay, E., & Persson, A. (2020). Does Public Country-by-Country Reporting Deter Tax Avoid-
ance and Income Shifting? Evidence from the European Banking Industry. Contemporary Accounting 
Research. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12601 
Kahnemann, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory: a decision making under risk. Econometrica, 
47(2), 263–291. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185 
Kessler, J. B., & Norton, M. I. (2016). Tax aversion in labor supply. Journal of Economic Behavior & Or-
ganization, 124, 15–28. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.09.022 
Kim, S., Schmidt, A. P., & Wentland, K. (2020). Analysts, Taxes, and the Information Environment. Jour-
nal of the American Taxation Association, 42(1), 103–131. https://doi.org/10.2308/atax-52515 
Kirchler, E. (2007). The economic psychology of tax behaviour. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Kling, S. (1992). Abschreibungen und Investitionsverhalten: Eine empirische Analyse. Frankfurt: Peter 
Lang.  
König, H., Laisney, F., Lechner, M., & Pohlmeier, W. (1995). Tax illusion and labour supply of married 
women : evidence from german data. KYKLOS, 48(3), 347–368. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
6435.1995.tb02319.x 
Kopczuk, W. (2007). Bequest and tax planning: Evidence from estate tax returns. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 122(4), 1801–1854. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2007.122.4.1801 
Kuziemko, I., Norton, M. I., Saez, E., & Stantcheva, S. (2015). How Elastic Are Preferences for Redistri-
bution? Evidence from Randomized Survey Experiments. American Economic Review, 105(4), 1478–
1508. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130360 
Lagarden, M., Schreiber, U., Simons, D., & Sureth-Sloane, C. (2020). Country-by-Country Reporting Goes 
Public - Cui Bono? International Transfer Pricing Journal, 27(2), 91–97. 
Lefebvre, M., Pestieau, P., Riedl, A., & Villeval, M. C. (2015). Tax evasion and social information: an ex-
periment in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands. International Tax and Public Finance, 22(3), 401–
425. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-014-9318-z 
Lewis, A. (1978). Perception of tax rates. British Tax Review. (6), 358–366. 
Liebman, J. B., & Zeckhauser, R. J. (2004). Schmeduling. Harvard University and NBER. Retrieved from 
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jeffreyliebman/files/Schmeduling_WorkingPaper.pdf 
Löfgren, Å., & Nordblom, K. (2009). Puzzling tax attitudes and labels. Applied Economics Letters, 16(18), 
1809–1812. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504850701719660 
Lozza, E., Carrera, S., & Bosio, A. C. (2010). Perceptions and outcomes of a fiscal bonus: Framing effects 
on evaluations and usage intentions. Journal of Economic Psychology, 31(3), 400–404. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2010.01.008 
McCaffery, E. J., & Baron, J. (2003). The Humpty Dumpty blues: Disaggregation bias in the evaluation of 
tax systems. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 91(2), 230–242. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0749-5978(03)00026-8 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697982
 
 48 
McGuire, S. T., Omer, T. C., & Sharp, N. Y. (2012). The Impact of Religion on Financial Reporting Irreg-
ularities. The Accounting Review, 87(2), 645–673. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-10206 
Mehrmann, A., & Sureth-Sloane, C. (2017). Tax loss offset restrictions and biased perception of risky in-
vestments. WU International Taxation Research Paper Series (2017-11). 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3046543 
Mills, L. F., Nutter, S. E., & Schwab, C. M. (2013). The Effect of Political Sensitivity and Bargaining 
Power on Taxes: Evidence from Federal Contractors. The Accounting Review, 88(3), 977–1005. 
https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-50368 
Möhlmann, A. (2013). Investor home bias and sentiment about the country benefiting from the tax revenue. 
Journal of Economic Psychology, 35, 31–46. 
Morone, A., Nemore, F., & Nuzzo, S. (2018). Experimental evidence on tax salience and tax incidence. 
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 20(4), 582–612. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12295 
Northcut, W. D., & Vines, C. C. (1998). Earnings Management in Response to Political Scrutiny of Effec-
tive Tax Rates. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 20(2), 22–36. 
Olsen, J., Kogler, C., Brandt, M. J., Dezső, L., & Kirchler, E. (2019). Are consumption taxes really disliked 
more than equivalent costs? Inconclusive results in the U.S.A. and no effect in the U.K. Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 75(A). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2019.02.001 
Overesch, M., & Wolff, H. (2017). Financial Transparency to the Rescue: Effects of Country-by-Country 
Reporting in the EU Banking Sector on Tax Avoidance. SSRN Working Paper (3075784). 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3075784 
Plumlee, M. A. (2003). The Effect of Information Complexity on Analysts' Use of That Information. The 
Accounting Review, 78(1), 275–296. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2003.78.1.275 
Rees-Jones, A., & Taubinsky, D. (2019). Measuring "Schmeduling". Review of Economic Studies, 2019(0), 
1–40. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz045 
Robinson, L. A., Stomberg, B., & Towery, E. M. (2016). One Size Does Not Fit All: How the Uniform 
Rules of FIN 48 Affect the Relevance of Income Tax Accounting. The Accounting Review, 91(4), 1195–
1217. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-51263 
Rosen, H. S. (1976a). Tax Illusion and the Labor Supply of Married Women. The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 58(2), 167–172. https://doi.org/10.2307/1924022 
Rosen, H. S. (1976b). Taxes in a Labor Supply Model with Joint Wage-Hours Determination. Economet-
rica, 44(3), 485–507. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913978 
Rupert, T. J., & Fischer, C. M. (1995). An Empirical Investigation of Taxpayer Awareness of Marginal Tax 
Rates. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 17(2), 36–59. 
Rupert, T. J., Single, L. E., & Wright, A. M. (2003). The impact of floors and phase-outs on taxpayers' 
decisions and understanding of marginal tax rates. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 25(1), 
72–86. https://doi.org/10.2308/jata.2003.25.1.72 
Rupert, T. J., & Wright, A. M. (1998). The Use of Marginal Tax Rates in Decision Making: The Impact of 
Tax Rate Visibility. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 20(2), 83–99. 
Sahm, C. R., Shapiro, M. D., & Slemrod, J. (2012). Check in the mail or more in the paycheck: does the 
effectiveness of fiscal stimulus depend on how it is delivered? American Economic Journal: Economic 
Policy, 4(3), 216–250. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.4.3.216 
Sausgruber, R., & Tyran, J.-R. (2005). Testing the Mill hypothesis of fiscal illusion. Public Choice, 122(1), 
39–68. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-3992-4 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697982
 
 49 
Schmölders, G. (1960). Das Irrationale in der öffentlichen Finanzwirtschaft: Probleme der Finanzpsycho-
logie (1. Auflage). Reinbek: Rowohlt Repertoire.  
Schmölders, G. (2006). The Psychology of Money and Public Finance. London, s.l.: Palgrave Macmillan 
UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230625112 
Schwenk, A. (2003). Die Wirkung impliziter Steuervorteile des Bilanzrechts: Empirische Untersuchung bei 
den DAX 100-Unternehmen (Gabler Edition Wissenschaft). Schriften zum Steuer-, Rechnungs- und Prü-
fungswesen. Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitätsverlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-81479-1 
Shin, J.-S. (1985). Perception of Price When Price Information Is Costly: Evidence from Residential Elec-
tricity Demand. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 67(4), 591. https://doi.org/10.2307/1924803 
Sides, J. (2016). Stories or Science? Facts, Frames, and Policy Attitudes. American Politics Research, 
44(3), 387–414. https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X15610190 
Sielaff, C., & Wolf, N. (2016). Tax rate complexity and labor supply: A real-effort experiment/Steuerkom-
plexität und Arbeitsangebot: Eine experimentelle Analyse am Beispiel der Einkommensteuertarifkom-
plexität. Die Betriebswirtschaft, 76(1), 65. 
Simon, H. A. (1959). Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioural Science. American Eco-
nomic Review, 49(3), 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-00210-8_1 
Simone, L. de, & Olbert, M. (2019). Real Effects of Private Country-by-Country Disclosure. SSRN Work-
ing Paper (3398116). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3398116 
Slemrod, J. (2006). The Role of Misconceptions in Support for Regressive Tax Reform. National Tax Jour-
nal, 59(1), 57–75. https://doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2006.1.03 
Stephens Jr, M., & Ward-Batts, J. (2004). The impact of separate taxation on the intra-household allocation 
of assets: evidence from the UK. Journal of Public Economics, 88(9-10), 1989–2007. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00067-7 
Sussman, A. B., & Olivola, C. Y. (2011). Axe the tax: Taxes are disliked more than equivalent costs. Jour-
nal of Marketing Research, 48(SPL), S91-S101. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.48.SPL.S91 
Taubinsky, D., & Rees-Jones, A. (2018). Attention Variation and Welfare: Theory and Evidence from a 
Tax Salience Experiment. The Review of Economic Studies, 85(4), 2462–2496. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdx069 
Thaler, R. H. (1990). Anomalies: Saving, fungibility, and mental accounts. Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 4(1), 193–205. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.4.1.193 
Thomas, J., & Zhang, F. X. (2011). Tax Expense Momentum. Journal of Accounting Research, 49(3), 791–
821. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2011.00409.x 
TNS Opinion & Social (2015). Special Eurobarometer 424 - Public Perceptions of VAT. Retrieved from 
http://data.europa.eu/88u/dataset/S2024_82_2_424_ENG 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Science, 
185(4157), 1124–1131. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 
Van Wagstaff, J. (1965). Income Tax Consciousness under Withholding. Southern Economic Journal, 
32(1), 73. https://doi.org/10.2307/1054985 
Watrin, C., & Ullmann, R. (2008). Comparing direct and indirect taxation: The influence of framing on tax 
compliance. The European Journal of Comparative Economics, 5(1), 33. 
Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1978). Towards a Positive Theory of the Determination of Accounting 
Standards. The Accounting Review, 53(1), 112–134. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697982
 
 50 
Weber, D. P. (2009). Do Analysts and Investors Fully Appreciate the Implications of Book-Tax Differences 
for Future Earnings? Contemporary Accounting Research, 26(4), 1175–1206. 
https://doi.org/10.1506/car.26.4.7 
Weber, M., & Schram, A. (2017). The Non-equivalence of Labour Market Taxes: A Real-effort Experi-
ment. The Economic Journal, 127(604), 2187–2215. 
Williamson, J. B. (1976). Beliefs About the Rich, the Poor and the Taxes They Pay. American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology, 35(1), 9–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.1976.tb01208.x 
Wittmann, F. (1986). Der Einfluß der Steuern auf die Investitionsentscheidungen der Unternehmen: Eine 
empirische Analyse. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag.  
Wong, J. (1988). Political costs and an intraperiod accounting choice for export tax credits. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 10(1), 37–51. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(88)90022-5 
Zimmerman, J. L. (1983). Taxes and firm size. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 5(2), 119–149. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(83)90008-3 
Zwick, E. (2020). The costs of corporate tax complexity. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 
forthcoming. 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697982
 51 
 
Appendix Table 1: Tax Misperception 
Reference Tax Type Country Subject Pool 
Sample 
Size 
Survey 
Year 
Research 
Design 
Research question Results 
Amir and 
Sougiannis (1999) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Analysts and 
investors 
1,085 
firm-year 
observa-
tions 
1992-
1994 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
How do financial analysts and 
equity investors incorporate 
information on deferred taxes 
from carryforwards into 
earnings forecasts and share 
prices? 
Analysts consider earnings of firms with tax loss 
carryforwards less persistent and tend to be less 
precise and more biased in forecasting these firms’ 
earnings. Investors value deferred taxes from 
carryforwards as assets but rate earnings and book 
values of equity less in firms with carryforwards. 
Auld (1979) Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Canada Individuals 630 1975 Survey How much do people know 
about public expenditure and 
their income tax burden? 
Respondents within the two lowest income groups 
and with the highest incomes significantly 
overestimate their taxes paid (overestimation factor: 
7.53, 1.95 and 2.73), while members of the upper 
income group underestimate their ATR 
(underestimation factor: 0.73). The ‘middle-income’ 
respondents accurately report their ATR. 
Baik, Kim, Morton, 
and Roh (2016) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Analysts and 
investors 
217,987 
firm-quar-
ter obser-
vations 
2002-
2013 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Do analysts‘ pre-tax income 
forecasts reduce investor 
mispricing of corporate income 
tax expense? 
When analysts’ issue pre-tax income forecasts in 
addition to (after-tax) earnings forecasts they 
implicitly provide a forecast of income tax expense. 
This implicit tax expense forecast reduces investor 
mispricing of corporate income tax expense. 
Ballard and Gupta 
(2018) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Individuals 978 2013 Survey Do individuals perceive their 
ATR correctly? 
84.9% of respondents who report numbers overstate 
their ATR, on average, by 11.6 percentage points This 
is an overestimation of actual ATRs by about 83%. 
The variety of misperceptions is extremely 
pronounced. More than one fifth of respondents do 
not know anything about their ATR. 
Bartels (2005) Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Individuals  1,511 2001-
2003 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Why has there been such a 
strong public support for the 
rather regressive ‘Bush tax 
cuts’? 
People support this regressive tax reform although 
they consider high-income households to pay too few 
taxes. Attitudes towards these tax cuts were shaped 
by self-interest rather than by preference for a 
progressive taxation. 
Bartolome (1995) Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
MBA students 125  Lab 
Experiment 
Do people use the MRT or the 
ART when making economic 
decisions? 
There are at least as many individuals who use the 
ATR 'as if' it were the MTR as individuals who use 
the true MTR. The cause of the widespread use of the 
ATR is shown to be the presented tax table: almost all 
individuals use the true MTR if the tax table is 
redesigned to stress the marginal rate. 
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Bischoff and Kusa 
(2019) 
Inheritance 
Tax 
Germany Citizens 1,255 2014-
2015 
Survey Should inherited wealth beyond 
a certain amount be taxed? 
Almost 60% of respondents reject an inheritance tax. 
The opposition to the taxation of inherited wealth can 
be explained by self-interest, redistributive 
preferences, and the adherence to traditional values to 
matter. An overestimation of the inheritance tax 
burden is also positively associated with the 
opposition to this tax. The majority of respondents 
misperceive the inheritance tax as 51% of the 
respondents have the erroneous belief that a child 
inheriting € 100,000 had to pay inheritance taxes. 
Blaufus et al. (2015) Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Individuals 1,009 2008 Survey How do individuals perceive 
ATRs for different income 
levels and their own MTR? 
The majority of respondents misperceive ATRs 
significantly. ATRs for low incomes are substantially 
overestimated (10.8 percentage points), ATRs for 
high incomes are considerably underestimated (6.5 
and 5 percentage points) and ATRs for medium 
incomes are accurately estimated. Misperception of 
one’s own MTRs is more pronounced but pattern 
remain the same. ATRs are often misperceived for 
MTRs. This occurs especially for respondents who 
underrate their MTR. In this group, 54% of 
respondents regard ATR and MTR as being equal. 
Bratten, Gleason, 
Larocque, and Mills 
(2017) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Analysts 321,225 
analyst-
firm-
quarters 
2003-
2014 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
How do analysts incorporate 
and improve on forecasts 
provided by management? 
Analysts pay attention to taxes. They incorporate and 
improve on management ETR forecasts. However, 
discrete items impair the forecast value of 
management ETR estimates. 
Brown (1969) Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Scotland Workers and 
managers 
232 (179 
workers 
and 53 
managers) 
1966-
1967 
Survey Do Scottish workers and 
managers perceive their MTR 
correctly? 
None of the workers and only 6% of the managers 
report correct MTRs and only 20% of the workers and 
23% of the managers reported roughly accurate 
numbers. MTR overestimates outnumber under-
estimates in both groups. The most striking difference 
between both groups is that 40% of the managers in 
contrast to 15% of the workers report a MTR which 
equals approximately the standard tax rate on 
unearned income (e.g. dividends or interest). 
Brushwood, 
Johnston, Kutcher, 
and Stekelberg 
(2019) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Firms 1,272 2015-
2016 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
What is the effect of ASU 
2016-09 on the accuracy of 
analysts’ ETR forecasts? 
Errors in analysts’ ETR forecasts significantly 
increase among firms that were most affected by ASU 
2016-09. Among firms reporting a material ETR 
effect due to early adoption of ASU 2016-09, 
analysts’ ETR forecast errors increased by 
approximately 0.94 percentage points, representing 
an approximate 24.7 percent increase in ETR forecast 
errors relative to the pre-adoption period. 
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Cabral and Hoxby 
(2012) 
Excise Tax United 
States 
Individuals 559 1980, 
1990, 
2000 
Survey How does salience affect 
property tax rates and limits? 
Tax escrow reduces salience and leads to a less 
accurate perception of the property tax burden. 
Salience decreases proper tax rates and increases the 
likelihood of the introduction of property tax limits. 
K. C. W. Chen, 
Danielson, and 
Schoderbek (2003) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Firms 114 1993-III Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
How are earnings forecasts 
revised following the 
disclosure of firms’ 1993-III 
deferred tax adjustments? 
Income-decreasing deferred tax adjustments are 
positively related to subsequent forecast revisions. 
This suggests that many analysts incorrectly interpret 
the deferred tax adjustment as a recurring item. 
Chetty, Looney, and 
Kroft (2009) 
Excise Tax United 
States 
Individuals  2005-
2006 
Field 
Experiment 
Do consumers react 
consistently to taxes that are not 
salient? 
Posting tax-inclusive price tags reduces demand by 8 
percent. Increases in taxes included in posted prices 
reduce alcohol consumption more than increases in 
taxes applied at the register. 
Chirvi and 
Schneider (2019) 
Wealth 
Taxes 
United 
States 
Individuals 2,101 2018 Non-
incentivized 
Survey 
Experiment 
How high do U.S. residents 
estimate the share of citizens 
that had to pay estate tax? 
Preferences for the taxation of wealth depend on 
personal characteristics of respondents and the tax 
design. Regarding the existing estate tax, respondents 
estimated on average that the share of citizens that 
had to pay estate tax is about 40%, which is 
overestimated, as the correct share would have been 
lower than 0.1 percent. Republicans, who oppose the 
estate tax, perceive the share significantly worse than 
Democrats. 
Chychyla, Falsetta, 
and Ramnath (2017) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Firms and 
analysts 
1) 29,112 
firm-year 
observa-
tions 
2) 7,445 
firm-year 
observa-
tions 
2002-
2015 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
What are the causes and 
consequences of the effective 
tax rate reconciliation 
presented in the footnotes to 
companies’ annual reports (10-
K)? 
1) Consistent with the political cost argument it is 
shown that firms with lower (higher) taxes relative 
that their pre-tax income, tend to reconcile ETRs in 
dollar amounts (percentages).  
2) Analysts’ forecasts of ETRs tend to be more 
accurate for firms that present reconciliations in 
percentages than in dollars. 
Dietrich, 
Kiesewetter, and 
Moosmann (2008) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
Sweden Firms 95 2004 Survey How do Swedish investors 
perceive the tax burden in 
Germany compared to Austria? 
Swedish firms state similar tax rates for investments 
in both countries, although the effective tax burden in 
Germany is significantly higher than in Austria. This 
implies that Swedish firms tend to perceive nominal 
rates rather than effective tax rates. 
Enrick (1963) Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Individuals 217 1961-
1962 
Survey What do people think is their 
total amount of federal income 
tax paid in a certain year? 
Slight tendency of taxpayers to underestimate their 
tax burden rather than to overestimate (56,7% versus 
37,7%), a considerable degree of error of estimation 
in general, and inability to demonstrate a differential 
effect of withholding taxes. 
Enrick (1964) Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Individuals 90 1963 Survey How aware of income taxes are 
individuals in the United 
States? 
Taxpayers are not fully aware of the taxes they pay. 
It appears that taxpayers may be under a certain 
degree of illusion as regards the full extent of their 
annual federal income tax burdens. 
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Ferber (1954) Excise Tax United 
States 
Individuals 166 1954 Survey How aware are consumer of 
excise tax changes. 
Respondents’ knowledge of excise tax changes was 
neither widespread nor accurate. The proportion of 
respondents who are aware of a tax change was no 
higher than 30 per cent, in the case of luggage, and 
was as low as 16 per cent in the case of refrigerators. 
Finkelstein (2009) Excise Tax United 
States 
Individuals 576 2004-
2007 
Survey Does the salience of a tax 
system affect equilibrium tax 
rates? 
Under Electronic Toll Collection, driving becomes 
less elastic with respect to the toll and the toll setting 
becomes less sensitive to the electoral calendar. 
Fisher and Wassmer 
(2017) 
Excise Tax United 
States 
Individuals 1) 600 
2) 1,241 
2014 Survey Does perception of the rate and 
amount of fuel taxes paid by an 
individual influence his or her 
support for funding highway 
improvements from any source 
of revenue? 
Car drivers often overestimate the rate of their state’s 
gasoline excise tax and their monthly tax burden. This 
misperception affect car drivers’ view on an increase 
in funding to support highway investments. An 
overestimation of the gasoline tax is associated with 
a lower willingness to pay for road improvements. 
Fujii and Hawley 
(1988) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Individuals  3,197 1983 Survey How accurate are estimates of 
the personal MRT of the federal 
income tax? 
About 2/3 of respondents were able to provide MTR 
estimates and underrate their MTR, on average, by 
about 3 percentage points (22.71% perceived versus 
25.99% actual MTR). About one third of respondents 
are not able to guess their MTR. 
Gemmell, 
Morrissey, and 
Pinar (2003, 2004) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax/ 
Excise Tax 
United 
Kingdom 
Individuals  780 1995 Survey Do respondents misperceive 
their MTR? 
32-44% of respondents report an accurate MTR. The 
remaining respondents exhibit a substantial bias 
towards an overestimate although there are also many 
respondents underestimating their MTR. 
Gensemer, Lean, 
and Neenan (1965) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Individuals 865 1964 Survey Are high-income earners in the 
U.S. aware of their MTR? 
27% of respondents are unaware of their MTR. Other 
numbers on perceptions are not given. Amongst other 
variables, ‘income’ and ‘education’ explain the 
accuracy of MTR perceptions. 
Gideon (2014) Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Individuals 348 2011, 
2013 
Survey How do individuals perceive 
their ATR and their MTR? 
Respondents overestimate their ATR across the 
income distribution, on average by about 6.3 
percentage points, with a more pronounced 
heterogeneity in the bottom quartile of cognitive 
ability. One’s own MTR is fairly accurately 
estimated, at the mean, but people with low incomes 
overestimate their MTR whereas the opposite holds 
for people at higher incomes. Measurement errors due 
to misreported income do not alter the results. 
Gideon (2017) Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Individuals 748 2011 Survey Do individuals perceive their 
ATR and MTR correctly? 
Respondents, on average, overestimate their ATR 
while they underestimate their MTR. MTRs are 
overestimated by respondents with lower income and 
underestimated by those with higher income. 
Respondents underestimate the top MTR on wage and 
salary income and overestimate the MTR on 
(preferentially taxed) dividend income Respondents 
underestimate the tax schedule progressivity. 
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Gleason, Mills, and 
Nessa (2018) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Firms 2,798 
firm-year 
observa-
tions 
2003-
2014 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
What is the impact of FIN 48 on 
the financial reporting quality 
of tax reserves? 
Firms, on average, adequately use tax reserves for 
IRS tax assessments before and after FIN 48. The 
introduction of FIN 48 improves the comparability of 
accounting for tax reserves between firms with and 
without auditor-provided tax services. 
Graham, Hanlon, 
Shevlin, and Shroff 
(2017) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Corporate tax 
executives 
500 2006 Survey and 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Which tax rate input do 
corporate executives use in 
decisions? What are the 
consequences of using 
incorrect tax rate inputs? 
Most public companies use GAAP ETR, while most 
private companies use STR. Using an ETR input 
results in non-optimal capital structure and 
investment sensitivity. 
Hoopes (2018) Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Analysts and 
investors 
22,140 
firm-year 
observa-
tions 
1997-
2011 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Does the expiration of tem-
porary tax laws affect capital 
market participants’ ability to 
understand and forecast 
earnings? 
Analysts’ forecast errors are larger for R&D credit 
firms in quarters when the R&D credit expired. The 
results point to analysts have difficulties to 
understand the effects of R&D tax credit on earnings. 
Additional information as earnings guidance 
provided by managers mitigate the effect. 
Hoppe, Schanz, 
Sturm, and Sureth-
Sloane (2019) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
Multina-
tional 
Tax 
consultants 
993 2016 Survey How does tax complexity vary 
across countries and hat are the 
main drivers of tax complexity? 
Is tax complexity associated 
with other country characte-
ristics? 
The overall level of tax complexity varies 
considerably across countries. Main drivers of tax 
complexity are the complexity of the transfer pricing 
regulations, in particular the documentation 
requirements and the ambiguity of the regulations, as 
well as the complexity of the tax audits, in particular 
by long limitation periods and inconsistent decisions 
by tax officials. Associations between tax complexity 
and other country characteristics are not very strong. 
Hundsdoerfer and 
Sichtmann (2009) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Individuals 131 2006 Survey Do self-employed physicians 
know their marginal tax rate? 
Are tax aspects overweighted in 
entrepreneurial decision-
making? 
About one quarter of participants do not know their 
MTR. Participants overweight tax aspects in their 
decisions. 
Hüsing (1999) Personal/ 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Firms 76 1989-
1993 
Survey To what extent are tax aspects 
integrated in investment 
planning processes of SMEs? 
The majority of firms (59%) do not use investment 
calculations which are suitable for tax considerations. 
The consideration of taxes for investment decisions 
depends on the personality of the decision-maker (i.e. 
personal tax consequences, tax knowledge, and 
experience). 
Kim, Schmidt, and 
Wentland (2020) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Analysts 7,839  1994-
2017 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
To which extent do analysts 
incorporate tax-based earnings 
information in their earnings 
forecasts relative to other 
earnings information? 
Analysts misunderstand tax-based earnings 
information to a greater extent than other earnings 
information. However, strong information 
environment of firms reduces analysts’ forecast errors 
for tax-based earnings information. 
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Kling (1992) Personal/ 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Firms/Tax 
Consultants 
217 (158 
firms and 
59 tax 
consul-
tants) 
1987 Survey How do tax depreciations affect 
investment behavior of firms? 
Firms primarily aim at getting depreciation-induced 
tax savings from their investments. 
Kuziemko, Norton, 
Saez, and 
Stantcheva (2015) 
Capital 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Individuals 10,000 2012 Non-
incentivized 
Survey 
Experiment 
What are the views of 
individuals on U.S. income 
inequality and what is the link 
between top income tax rates 
and economic growth, and the 
estate tax? 
Giving information on inequality has significant 
effects on views about inequality but only slightly 
moves tax and transfer policy preferences. An 
exception is the estate tax: Informing respondents of 
the small share of decedents who pay it doubles 
support for it. 
Lagarden, 
Schreiber, Simons, 
and Sureth-Sloane 
(2020) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
Europe    Theoretical 
Analysis 
Can public CbCR reduce 
information asymmetries 
between MNEs and the general 
public they operate in?  
By employing the sender-signal-receiver framework 
the authors conclude that the introduction of public 
CbCR does not necessarily improve transparency, as 
the general public might misunderstand it and 
question it through tax morale rather than tax law. 
Lewis (1978) Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
Kingdom 
Individuals 200 1977 Survey How much has to be paid in 
taxes for an extra pound in 
income? 
British taxpayers, on average, tend to underestimate 
MTRs over the whole income range by approximately 
11% for each income bracket. The misperception is 
lower for MTRs close to respondents’ own income 
bracket. About 10% of respondents fail to report 
numbers on MTRs. 
Plumlee (2003) Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Analysts 355 1984-
1988 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
To which extent do analysts’ 
effective tax rate forecasts 
incorporate information related 
to six tax-law changes of 
varying complexity? 
The magnitude of errors in analysts’ ETR forecasts 
increases with complexity in tax-law changes. 
Analysts are able to fully incorporate less complex 
but not more complex information in their ETR 
forecasts. 
Rees-Jones and 
Taubinsky (2019) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Individuals 4,197 2015 Incentivized 
Survey 
Experiment 
Which heuristic do individuals 
use to approximate the tax 
schedule? 
Respondents’ estimates on the tax burden of several 
given incomes reveal a perception of the tax schedule 
similar to but more linear than the true tax schedule. 
On average, actual tax rates are overestimated. 
However, while tax burdens for low income levels are 
overestimated the opposite holds true for higher 
incomes. The higher the income of respondents, the 
higher the income at which respondents tend to 
reverse overestimation into underestimation. 
Robinson, 
Stomberg, and 
Towery (2016) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Firms 1) 16,436 
firm-year 
observa-
tions 
2) 16,241 
firm-year 
observa-
tions 
2007-
2011 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Does FIN 48 change the 
relevance of income tax 
accounting? 
FIN 48 does not increase the relevance of accounting 
for income taxes because (1) tax reserves do not 
exceed cash settlements more after FIN 48 than 
before, and (2) the predictive value of tax expenses 
for future tax cash outflows even decreases. 
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Rupert and Fischer 
(1995) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Individuals 108 1994 Survey Are U.S. taxpayers aware of 
their MTR?  
On average, there is a slight MTR overestimate of 
some more than 3 percentage points (if absolute 
values of MTR misperception are used overestimates, 
on average, amount to more than 8 percentage 
points). Less than 10% of respondents perceive their 
MTR correctly whereas 60% over- and 32% 
underestimate their MTR by nearly 10 and -8 
percentage points respectively. 
Schmölders (1960) Personal 
Income 
Tax 
(West) 
Germany 
Individuals   1958 Survey How do German individuals 
perceive their own income tax 
burden? 
About 50% of respondents overestimate their tax 
burden, around 20% underestimate their tax burden 
and nearly one third hold accurate beliefs. 
Significantly less farmers and sole proprietors are 
able to provide accurate estimates than employees 
are. The majority of farmers (55%) and sole 
proprietors (64%) overestimate their average tax 
burden. 
Sides (2016) Estate Tax United 
States 
Individuals 1,829 2007-
2008 
Non-
incentivized 
Survey 
Experiment 
How much do factual 
information and other kinds of 
frames affect policy attitudes? 
Respondents expect on average 21% of all Americans 
to ‘have a large enough estate to be subject’ to the 
estate tax. Regarding attitudes towards the estate tax, 
Republicans, and in particular those with lower 
incomes, were most affected by exposure to correct 
information about the tax. 
Slemrod (2006) Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Individuals  1,339 2002 Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Why do people support an 
apparently regressive reform? 
People misperceive the current U.S. income tax as 
regressive. 
Schwenk (2003) Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Firms 50 2000 Survey How do firms perceive tax 
advantages of German GAAP? 
Current value tax depreciations or provisions are not 
perceived as tax advantages. More than one third of 
corporations do not consider taxes for investment 
decisions at all. 
Taubinsky and 
Rees-Jones (2018) 
Excise Tax United 
States 
Individuals 2,998 2016 Incentivized 
Survey 
Experiment 
How do consumers react to 
non-salient sales taxes? 
Consumers under-react to non-salient sales taxes. 
Consumers in the study react to existing sales taxes as 
if they were only 25% of their size. 
Thomas and Zhang 
(2011) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Investors 604,067 
firm-year 
observatio
ns 
1977-
2006 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Do the following two 
hypotheses hold jointly? 
Unexpected increase in tax 
expense represents good news 
and that information is reflected 
in stock prices with a delay. 
Unexpected increase in tax expense is positively 
associated with next quarter’s stock returns. There are 
two channels for the delayed market response: 
Quarterly tax expense surprise predicts next quarter’s 
surprises for (1) earnings and  (2) tax expense. The 
authors conclude that investors do not fully assess the 
change in tax expense. 
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TNS Opinion & 
Social (2015) 
Excise Tax EU28 
European 
Member 
States 
Individuals 27,868 2014 Survey What knowledge do Europeans 
have of VAT levels in their 
country and what importance 
do citizens attach to VAT as a 
source of public revenue? 
Nearly two-thirds (65%) of European citizens were 
able to correctly cite their national standard VAT rate. 
van Wagstaff (1965) Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Employers 1162  Survey To what extent is the American 
public conscious about income 
tax? 
Some more than 10% of respondents hold accurate 
beliefs about their tax burden. Underestimates and 
overestimates are almost balanced (42.9% versus 
44.5%). Employees in lower income groups tend to 
overestimate whereas in higher income groups there 
is a tendency to underestimate. Respondents’ 
estimates exhibit a substantial dispersion. 
D. P. Weber (2009) Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Firms and 
analysts 
14,211 
firm-year 
observa-
tions 
1984-
2004 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Do two types of market 
participants, equity investors 
and sell-side financial analysts, 
use book-tax differences 
(BTDs) information to form 
efficient earnings expectations 
and is the association between 
BTDs and future stock returns 
due to mispricing or omitted 
risk factors? 
Analysts’ forecasts of future earnings are more 
overoptimistic when book income is high relative to 
tax income. Regarding investors, the relation between 
BTDs and future returns (1) is concentrated among 
firms with weaker information environment (2) is not 
significant any more controlling for analysts’ forecast 
errors. Both indicates mispricing due to BTDs. 
Williamson (1976) Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Individuals 375 1972 Survey and 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
What is the ATR of families 
with different income levels? 
Respondents significantly overestimate ATRs for 
each of the three income categories. Both the 
percentage of respondents overestimating ATRs 
(about 70%) and the magnitude of ATRs 
overestimates (about 11 percentage points) do not 
differ considerably between the three income groups. 
Wittmann (1986) Personal/ 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Entrepreneurs 
and Manager 
209 1980 Survey and 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Do firms consider taxes in their 
investment decision-making? 
Only 7% of firms use the appropriate MTR input, and 
only 7% uses the correct depreciation rate. 
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Appendix Table 2: Effect of Tax Misperception on Decision-Making 
Reference Tax Type Country Subject Pool 
Sample 
Size 
Survey 
Year 
Research 
Design 
Research question Results 
Abeler and Jäger 
(2015) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
Kingdom 
Individuals  277   Lab 
Experiment 
How does complexity affect 
people’s reaction to tax 
changes? 
Subjects in the complex treatment underreact to new 
taxes; some ignore new taxes entirely. The 
underreaction is stronger for subjects with lower 
cognitive ability. Contrary to predictions from models 
of rational inattention, subjects are equally likely to 
ignore large or small incentive changes. 
Ackermann, 
Fochmann, and 
Mihm (2013) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Germany  Students 119   Lab 
Experiment 
How do taxes and subsidies 
affect portfolio choices? 
The willingness to invest in a risky asset decreases 
markedly when an income tax has to be paid or when 
a subsidy is received. 
Alstadsæter and 
Jacob (2017) 
Personal/C
orporate 
Income 
Tax 
Sweden Individuals/ 
Corporations  
7,190,676 
442,712  
2002-
2009 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Why do not all individuals 
participate in tax avoidance? 
In addition to monetary benefits from tax avoidance 
(incentives), the opportunity to participate in tax 
avoidance (access), as well as information and 
knowledge about these opportunities (awareness), are 
important factors for the individual’s tax avoidance 
decision. They further show that tax avoidance 
spreads within communities. 
Amberger, 
Eberhartinger, and 
Kasper (2016) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
Austria 1) Students  
2) Tax 
professionals 
1) 141  
2) 62 
  Lab 
Experiment 
Does a decision bias reduce the 
quality of corporate tax-
planning decisions? 
Decision-makers overestimate the relevance of less 
complex tax-rate information compared to more 
complex tax-base information. Tax-planning choices 
are unaffected by participants’ professional 
experience. Time constraints impede the use of 
complex information which can result in suboptimal 
tax planning. 
Arrazola, Hevia, and 
Sanz (2000) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Spain Married men 1,406 1994 Survey Misperception of marginal tax 
rates 
Prominent divergences between subjective 
perception and formal income tax rates income. 
Bach (2015) Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
France Corporations 915,000 
firm year 
observa-
tions 
1996-
2007 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Why do firms react differently 
to avoidance incentives given 
by non-linear taxes and 
regulations? 
Tax elasticities reflect in great part the speed of tax 
code learning by firms and more profitable firms 
learn faster. 
 
Bartolome (1995) Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Students 125   Lab 
Experiment 
Do people use the MRT or the 
ART when making economic 
decisions? 
There are at least as many individuals who use the 
average tax rate 'as if' it were the marginal tax rate as 
individuals who use the true marginal tax rate. The 
cause of the widespread use of the average tax rate is 
shown to be the presentation of the tax table: almost 
all individuals use the true marginal tax rate if the tax 
table is redesigned to stress the marginal rate. 
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Beshears, Choi, 
Laibson, and 
Madrian (2017) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
Kingdom 
Employees 1) 5,552  
2) 7,000 
1) 2006 - 
2010  
2) 2014 
1) Archival 
Data 
Analysis  
2) Non-
incentivized 
Survey 
Experiment 
Can governments increase 
private savings by taxing 
savings up front instead of in 
retirement? 
No evidence that total 401(k) contribution rates differ 
between employees hired before versus after Roth 
introduction, which implies that take-home pay 
declines and the amount of retirement consumption 
being purchased by 401(k) contributions increases 
after Roth introduction. 
Blaufus, Bob, 
Hundsdoerfer, 
Kiesewetter, and 
Weimann (2013) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Germany 1) Working 
individuals  
2) Employees 
1) 467  
2) 56 
 1) Non-
incentivized 
Survey 
Experiment 
2) Lab 
Experiment 
How do changes in the tax rate 
and the tax base influence the 
perceived tax burden? 
The majority of individuals do not make rational tax 
decisions based on the actual tax burden but rather use 
simple decision heuristics. This leads to an 
irrationally high impact of changes in nominal tax 
rates on the perceived tax burden. 
Blaufus and Milde 
(2020) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Students 722 2016, 
2017, 
2019 
 
Lab 
Experiments 
How do tax misperceptions 
affect individuals’ retirement 
savings and do informational 
tax nudges and the form of the 
tax subsidy promote tax 
responses that are in line with 
rational choice predictions? 
Deferred taxation results in after-tax pensions that are 
approximately 25% lower compared to an 
economically equivalent immediate pension tax 
system. Tax misperceptions nearly disappear for all 
subjects only if recurrent numerical informational 
pension tax nudges are provided and if subjects have 
gained experience. Replacing the tax deductibility of 
retirement savings with government matching 
contributions increases after-tax pensions above the 
level under immediate taxation without the need to 
provide informational tax nudges. 
Blaufus and 
Möhlmann (2014) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Students 110  2008, 
2009 
Lab 
Experiment 
How does tax aversion affect 
the behavioral responses to 
differently taxed securities? 
Initial overvaluation of tax payments that diminishes 
when subjects gain experience. The tax deduction of 
expenses is valued more than an equivalent tax 
exemption of earnings. The persistence of the tax 
aversion bias critically depends on the quality of 
feedback. 
Blaufus and 
Möhlmann (2016) 
Wealth/ 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Students 136  2013 Lab 
Experiment 
Does a wealth tax discourage 
risk-taking in comparison to an 
income tax? 
Higher risk taking in the case of a wealth tax 
compared to a net equivalent income tax. This result 
is in line with a proposed behavioral perception bias, 
an income effect based on a less salient wealth tax 
burden, leading to more risk-taking with a wealth tax. 
Blaufus and Ortlieb 
(2009) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Students 983 2006, 
2007 
Non-
incentivized 
Survey  
Experiment 
Does tax complexity influence 
employees’ decision 
concerning company pension 
plans? 
If tax complexity is high, then only a small proportion 
of the study participants base their decision on their 
after-tax return. This proportion increases 
significantly if tax complexity is low. 
Blumkin, Ruffle, 
and Ganun (2012) 
Excise/ 
Income 
Tax 
Israel Students 80 2010 Lab 
Experiment 
Do a labor-income tax and an 
equivalent consumption tax 
lead to identical labor-leisure 
allocations? 
Subjects reduce their labor supply significantly more 
in response to an income tax than to an equivalent 
consumption tax. 
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Boylan (2013) Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Students 70   Lab 
Experiment 
How does tax rate transparency 
affect decisions of individuals 
who transact in a competitive 
environment? 
A lack of tax rate transparency has a negative effect 
on profits earned in the markets. Greater transparency 
leads to higher profits for those who had access to the 
information about the relevant tax rate. The effect of 
greater transparency spills over to those who did not 
have access to tax rate information. 
Boylan and 
Frischmann (2006) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Students 42   Lab 
Experiment 
To what extent does the 
complexity in determining 
one’s marginal tax rate produce 
decision errors in single-person 
investment settings in which 
individuals must choose 
between investments with 
different after-tax returns when 
investments are made in 
competitive markets? 
First, tax complexity leads to systematically (and 
inefficiently) high trading prices and quantities in 
these markets, which jointly limits the amount of 
wealth created, and leads to systematic wealth 
transfers between market participants and the taxing 
authority. Second, these effects generally diminish 
over the course of the experiment but do not disappear 
entirely. 
Brännäs and 
Karlsson (1996) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Sweden Individuals 726 1981 Survey Does the perceived tax scale 
differ from the true one? 
The differences between the true and estimated tax 
scales are found to be small. 
Chambers and 
Spencer (2008) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Students 141   Non-
incentivized 
Survey 
Experiment 
Will tax refunds administered 
as one lump-sum be saved (vs. 
spent) more than tax refunds of 
the same amount refunded 
monthly through revised 
income tax withholding tables? 
A refund delivered in monthly amounts stimulated 
current spending more than if the same yearly total 
tax reduction was delivered in one lump-sum. 
Chetty et al. (2009) Excise Tax United 
States 
Individuals    2006 Field 
Experiment 
and 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Do consumers react 
consistently to taxes that are not 
salient? 
Posting tax-inclusive price tags reduces demand by 8 
percent. Increases in taxes included in posted prices 
reduce alcohol consumption more than increases in 
taxes applied at the register. 
Chetty, Friedman, 
Leth-Petersen, 
Nielsen, and Olsen 
(2014) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Denmark Individuals 4 Million 
individual
s 
1995-
2009 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Do retirement savings policies 
raise total wealth accumulation 
or simply induce individuals to 
shift savings across accounts? 
Approximately 15% of individuals are ‘active savers’ 
who respond to tax subsidies primarily by shifting 
assets across accounts; 85% of individuals are 
‘passive savers’ who are unresponsive to subsidies 
but are instead heavily influenced by automatic 
contributions made on their behalf. Active savers tend 
to be wealthier and more financially sophisticated. 
Djanali and 
Sheehan-Connor 
(2012) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Students 66   Lab 
Experiment 
Do individuals derive non-
negligible utility from paying 
taxes due to their pro-social 
tendencies? 
Subjects worked more in the presence of tax than in 
its absence at the same net wage rate. The impact of 
wage changes on labor supply depended not only on 
the after-tax wage rate, but also on the tax rate. 
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Epley, Mak, and 
Idson (2006) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
1) Individuals 
2) Students 
1) 58  
2) 116 
1) 2002 1) Field 
Experiment 
2) Lab 
Experiment 
Do subjects spend more if a tax 
reduction is framed as a bonus 
instead of a tax rebate? 
People are more likely to spend income framed as a 
gain from a current wealth state than income framed 
as a return to a prior state. 
Fahr, Janssen, and 
Sureth (2014) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax. 
Germany Students 208 2012 Lab 
Experiment 
How do tax rate changes affect 
investment timing in the 
presence of risk as well as entry 
and exit flexibility? 
While the presence of an exit option seems to be 
irrelevant for investment timing in the case of an 
experienced tax rate decrease, it affects investment 
timing in the case of a tax rate increase. 
Falsetta and Tuttle 
(2011) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Students 89  Lab 
Experiments 
Do taxes still matter in 
situations in which investments 
have no tax consequences? 
The year-end tax position (tax refund or tax payment) 
can alter taxpayers’ investment strategies, even when 
stock transactions have no economic tax effect. 
Falsetta, Rupert, and 
Wright (2013) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Students 117   Field 
Experiment 
How do the effects of timing 
(gradual versus immediate) and 
direction (tax increase or 
decrease) of a tax change affect 
taxpayer behavior? 
A tax decrease implemented gradually over several 
years will result in a greater increase in risky 
investment once the decrease is fully implemented 
than when the tax change is implemented all at once. 
In contrast, once a tax increase (a ‘loss’) is fully 
implemented, a smaller decrease in risky investment 
results when the change occurs all at once rather than 
gradually. 
Feldman and Ruffle 
(2015) 
VAT Israel Students 180   Lab 
Experiment 
How does consumer demand 
respond to price components 
that are deducted at the register 
such that the final price is 
below the initial price? 
Subjects spend about 25% more under tax-exclusive 
prices whereas total purchases under tax-inclusive 
and tax-rebate prices are similar. 
Feldman, Goldin, 
and Homonoff 
(2018) 
Sales Tax United 
States 
Students 227   Lab 
Experiment 
Does a ‘salience effect’ depend 
on the magnitude of the tax? 
There is no evidence that salience effects decline as 
the tax rate increases. 
Fochmann and 
Hemmerich (2018) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Students 79 2013 Lab 
Experiment 
How does a proportional 
income tax (with and without 
full loss offset) affects 
investment behavior? 
The willingness to invest in the risky asset decreases 
when the income is subject to a tax. This result holds 
irrespective of whether a full loss offset or no loss 
offset is provided. The riskily invested amount in the 
full-loss-offset is higher compared to a no-loss-offset 
treatment. 
Fochmann, 
Hemmerich, and 
Kiesewetter (2016) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Students 94 2014 Lab 
Experiment 
How are perceived risk and 
emotional reactions to taxation 
related to the occurrence of tax 
perception biases?  
Perceived risk is lower and willingness to take risk is 
higher with a capital gains tax (with full loss offset 
provision) than without taxation. The positive effect 
on risky investment is higher in a situation with a 
rather low level of tax information in which tax 
complexity is high and tax salience is low. 
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Fochmann, Hewig, 
Kiesewetter, and 
Schüßler (2017) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Students 72 2012 Lab 
Experiment 
How is decision-making 
affected by emotional and 
cognitive reactions to different 
tax regulations? 
A loss offset provision increases the willingness to 
take risk whereas a tax on gains decreases risk-taking. 
There is a highly significant influence of valence 
perception on choice patterns. 
Fochmann and 
Jacob (2015) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
 Investors   Theoretical 
Analysis 
Why do loss offset restrictions 
exist and to what degree do loss 
aversion and risk attitude affect 
the degree of a loss offset 
restriction? 
If investors are (1) more risk averse in case of gains, 
(2) less risk seeking in case of losses, or (3) more loss 
averse, loss offset rules should be more restrictive. 
 
Fochmann and 
Kleinstück (2014) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Students 84 2010 Lab 
Experiment 
Are we willing to accept a 
reduced income only to save on 
taxes? (tax aversion) 
No evidence for the existence of tax aversion. 
Fochmann, 
Kiesewetter, and 
Sadrieh (2012a) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Students 126   Lab 
Experiment 
To what extent are investors’ 
choices affected by a biased 
perception of income taxation? 
Aggregated income taxation with complete loss 
deduction induces a sustained bias towards more 
risky investment decisions, while disaggregated 
income taxation does not. 
Fochmann, 
Kiesewetter, and 
Sadrieh (2012b) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Students 91   Lab 
Experiment 
To what extent are investors’ 
choices affected by limited loss 
deduction in income taxation? 
Partial and capped loss deduction increase risk taking. 
Fochmann and 
Weimann (2013) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Employees 245   Field 
Experiment 
How is the work-leisure 
decision affected by tax? 
For constant net wages, the effort is significantly 
higher under the tax than in the no tax treatment. Tax 
perception depends on the tax rate, the presentation of 
the tax and the experience subjects have with 
taxation. 
Fochmann, 
Weimann, Blaufus, 
Hundsdoerfer, and 
Kiesewetter (2013) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Employees 127   Lab 
Experiment 
How is the work-leisure 
decision affected by tax? 
Subjects worked harder and longer when they were 
taxed (net wage illusion effect). Not only the tax rate 
and the tax base are important for work incentives, 
but also the perception of a tax. 
Goldin and 
Homonoff (2013) 
Excise/ 
Sales 
Taxes 
United 
States 
Individuals 
over 18 
1.3  
million  
1984-
2000 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Should governments levy 
commodity taxes at the register 
or include them in a good’s 
posted price? 
Whereas all consumers respond to taxes that appear 
in cigarettes’ posted price, the results suggest that 
only low-income consumers respond to taxes levied 
at the register. 
Goupille-Lebret and 
Infante (2018) 
Inheritance 
Tax 
France Individuals  343,869  2003-
2013 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
What is the impact of 
inheritance taxation on wealth 
accumulation? 
Results cannot be explained by an absence of tax 
salience and are not consistent with forward-looking 
individuals’ decisions. In contrast, results are 
consistent with the existence of psychological biases 
such as myopia and denial of death. 
Graham et al. (2017) Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Corporate tax 
executives 
500 2006 Survey and 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Which tax rate inputs do 
corporate executives use in 
decisions? What are the 
consequences of using 
incorrect tax rate inputs? 
Most public companies use GAAP ETR, while most 
private companies use STR. Using an ETR input 
results in non-optimal capital structure and 
investment sensitivity. 
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Hayashi, Nakamura, 
and Gamage (2013) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Mostly 
students 
1) 150 
2) 148 
1) 2009 
2) 2012 
Lab 
Experiments 
Does different wage framing 
have an impact on the decision 
to choose work rather than 
leisure activity? 
Subjects are less willing to work when their wages are 
partitioned with positive and with negative surcharge 
components. 
Hlouskova and 
Tsigaris (2012) 
Capital 
Income 
Tax 
 Investors   Theoretical 
Analysis 
What are the effects of a 
proportional capital income 
taxation on risk taking as well 
as its effects on public and 
private sector risk for a 
sufficiently loss averse 
investor? 
The effects of taxation are demonstrated based on 
some reasonable reference levels such as one’s 
current asset position, or reference levels set at the 
gross after tax safe return from investing initial 
wealth. Under these cases, a capital income tax does 
not affect risk taking even if the tax code offers 
attractive loss offset provisions. 
Hundsdoerfer and 
Sichtmann (2009) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Self-employed 
physicians 
131 2006 Survey Do self-employed physicians 
know their MTR? Are taxes 
overweighted in entrpreneurial 
decision-making? 
About one quarter of participants do not know their 
MTR. Participants overweight tax aspects in their 
decisions. 
Kessler and Norton 
(2016) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Students 325 2012 Lab 
Experiment 
How does labor supply react to 
taxation? 
The productivity decrease that arises from taxation, is 
40% due to the lower net wage and the remaining 
60% to tax aversion. Tax aversion affects labor 
supply more on the extensive margin (working less) 
than on the intensive margin (being less productive 
while working). Tax aversion is equally strong 
whether tax revenue goes to the U.S. government or 
back to the experimenter (a ‘laboratory tax’). 
König, Laisney, 
Lechner, and 
Pohlmeier (1995) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Individuals between 
1,068-
1,328 
obeserva-
tions per 
year 
1985-
1989 
Survey To what extent do consumers 
perceive their true marginal tax 
rate when they make their labor 
supply decisions? How does the 
perception of the marginal tax 
rate differ among various socio-
economic groups? 
The assumption of complete knowledge of the tax 
system does not fit the data well, and education 
appears to be the main determinant to a correct 
perception of the marginal tax rate. 
Kopczuk (2007) Estate Tax United 
States 
Individuals 40,462 1969-
1977 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Do wealthy individuals change 
their behavior shortly before 
death regarding the estates 
reported on tax returns? 
The presence of significant tax motivated actions 
following the onset of a terminal illness reveals a 
desire to control disposition of assets, but it also 
implies that more tax planning could have been 
pursued earlier. Procrastination in estate planning is 
an important phenomenon. 
Lozza, Carrera, and 
Bosio (2010) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Italy 1) Individuals 
2) Taxpayers  
1) 2,000  
2) 252 
  1) Survey  
2) Lab 
Experiment 
Is presenting a fiscal bonus as 
an income increase (a gain) the 
same as presenting it as a tax 
rebate (a loss reduction)? 
Respondents attached a higher importance to the 
bonus and were keener to save it when it was 
described as a loss reduction, compared to it being 
presented as a gain. 
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McCaffery and 
Baron (2003) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Individuals 188   Non-
incentivized 
Survey- 
Experiment 
Are attitudes toward tax 
regimes subject to 
disaggregation bias and a 
metric effect? 
Subjects focused on the tax component they were 
asked to manipulate and did not respond fully to 
changes in the other component of the tax system. In 
addition, subjects preferred higher rates of graduation 
when tax burdens were stated in percent terms rather 
than in dollars. 
Mehrmann and 
Sureth-Sloane 
(2017) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
 Individuals   Theoretical 
Analysis 
What are the effects of tax loss 
offset restrictions on the 
evaluation of risky investments 
under bounded rationality of 
decision-makers? 
Taxation of gains and losses leads to ambiguous tax 
effects, even under complete loss offset, for investors 
with bounded rationality.  
Möhlmann (2013) Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Students 49 2012 Lab 
Experiment 
Are investors concerned about 
the country benefiting from a 
tax? 
The results suggest that investors prefer domestic 
equity and invest in riskier portfolios in case of a 
foreign tax rather than a domestic tax on foreign 
dividend income. 
Olsen, Kogler, 
Brandt, Dezső, and 
Kirchler (2019) 
VAT United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
Individuals U.S.: 590, 
UK: 595 
2018 Non-
incentivized 
Survey 
Experiment 
Are consumption taxes really 
disliked more than equivalent 
costs? 
Tax aversion in hypothetical consumption decisions 
seems to be a smaller phenomenon than originally 
proposed and does not generalize to a value added tax 
system. 
Rosen (1976a) Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Individuals 2,545 1967 Survey How do taxes affect labor 
supply considering potential 
tax misperceptions? 
Subjects do not suffer from tax illusion. 
Rosen (1976b) Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Individuals 2,545 1967 Survey Do taxes have an impact on 
married women in the labor 
force? 
Marginal tax rates have an important impact on labor 
force behavior. 
Rupert, Single, and 
Wright (2003) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Students 89   Lab 
Experiment 
Is there an influence of tax rate 
complexity on understanding of 
marginal tax rates and 
investment decisions? 
Decision performance was significantly better for 
participants facing the low complexity system than 
those in the medium or high complexity systems. 
Rupert and Wright 
(1998) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Students 113   Lab 
Experiment 
Does the visibility of the 
marginal tax rate affect 
taxpayers’ decision-making. 
Increased visibility of the rate structure significantly 
enhanced decision performance. Further, learning 
was most rapid for the high visibility conditions. 
Sahm, Shapiro, and 
Slemrod (2012) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Individuals 2,952 2008-
2009 
Survey Does the effectiveness of fiscal 
stimulus depend on how it is 
delivered? 
The reduction in withholding in 2009 boosted 
spending at roughly half the rate (13%) as the one-
time payments in 2008. 
Sielaff and Wolf 
(2016) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Students 96   Lab 
experiment 
Is there an influence of tax rate 
complexity on individual labor 
supply? 
Taxpayers’ labor supply decreases with increasing 
tax rate complexity. 
Stephens Jr and 
Ward-Batts (2004) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
Kingdom 
Individuals 10,000 
house-
holds each 
year 
1984-
1998 
Survey Impact of the UK tax reform 
1990 on the intra-household 
allocation of asset income? 
Only eighteen to thirty percent optimally allocated 
their assets. 
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Sussman and 
Olivola (2011) 
Sales Tax/ 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Individuals 1,845   Non-
incentivized 
Survey- 
Experiments 
Are taxes more disliked than 
equivalent costs? 
People have a stronger preference to avoid tax-related 
costs than to avoid equal-sized (or larger) monetary 
costs unrelated to taxes. 
Taubinsky and 
Rees-Jones (2018) 
Excise Tax United 
States 
U.S adult  2,998 2016 Field 
Experiment 
How do consumers react to non 
fully-salient sales taxes? 
Consumers under-react to non-salient sales taxes. 
Consumers in the study react to existing sales taxes as 
if they were only 25% of their size. 
Watrin and Ullmann 
(2008) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax/Con-
sumption 
Tax 
  Students 80   Lab 
Experiment 
Is compliance influenced by the 
framing of the taxes? 
Median compliance is 10.2 percentage points higher 
in the income tax framing than in the consumption tax 
framing. 
M. Weber and 
Schram (2017) 
Personal 
Income 
Tax 
Nether-
lands 
Students 240 2012 Lab 
Experiment 
What are the effects of a labor 
market tax levied on employers 
and a corresponding income tax 
levied on employees on labor 
supply? 
Under employer-side taxes, labor supply is lower. 
Zwick (2020) Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Firms 612,070  1998-
2011 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Does tax code complexity alter 
corporate behavior? 
Only 37% of eligible firms claim their refund. 
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Appendix Table 3: Management of Tax Perception and its Impact on Stakeholders 
Reference Tax Type Country Subject Pool 
Sample 
Size 
Survey 
Year 
Research 
Design 
Research question Results 
Akamah, Hope, and 
Thomas (2018) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States  
Firms 2,698 1998-
2010 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Do multinational companies 
operating in tax havens tend to 
aggregate their geographical 
disclosures to a greater extent? 
Multinational firms with higher activities in tax 
havens tend to aggregate their disclosures about their 
operations in tax havens to a higher degree to reduce 
the transparency of their tax avoidance activities. 
These results are stronger for larger firms with higher 
political costs, for firms in natural-resources 
industries, in retail industries, or with low 
competition. 
Balakrishnan, 
Blouin, and Guay 
(2019) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Firms 40,193 
firm-year 
observa-
tions 
1990-
2013 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Does aggressive tax planning 
reduce corporate transparency? 
Firms engaging in aggressive tax planning exhibit 
lower transparency. However, they tend to disclose 
more. 
Baloria and Klassen 
(2017) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Democratic 
and 
Republican 
congressional 
candidates  
891 2012 Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Do firms affiliated with 
politicians through campaign 
contributions use accounting 
discretion during elections to 
avoid releasing politically 
damaging financial 
information?  
Prior to elections, firms affiliated with tax cut 
supporting candidates increase their ETR by 3% on 
average relative to nonelection quarters and other-
supporting firms. The results indicate that the 
variation in upward ETR management is correlated 
with firm-level proxies for potential reputational 
costs, capital markets costs, and long-run tax burdens.  
N. Chen, Chi, and 
Shevlin (2019) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Firms 44,383 
firm-
quarter 
observa-
tions 
 
2006-
2016 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Why do firm that are subject to 
mandatory ETR forecasts 
disclose additional tax 
information voluntarily? To 
what extent do analysts forecast 
revisions incorporate 
mandatory and voluntary ETR 
forecasts? 
Managers are more likely to provide voluntary ETR 
forecasts when tax complexity is high. Analysts use 
both voluntary and mandatory ETR forecasts to 
inform their ETR forecast revisions but pay more 
attention to voluntary disclosures. The results indicate 
that non-GAAP, GAAP, and unspecified ETR-based 
forecasts are incrementally informative over 
mandatory ETR forecasts.  
Chychyla et al. 
(2017) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Firms 1) 5,413  
- 2,400 
 
 
2) 92 
 
2002-
2015 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
 
 
Lab 
Experiment 
What are the determinants and 
effects of the chosen disclosure 
format of ETR reconciliation?  
 
Firms with low (high) ETRs tend to highlight the 
dollar (percentage) amount of their tax expense. A 
one standard deviation increase in a firm’s ETR 
increases the likelihood of the firm using the 
percentage format by 12.32%. This is more 
pronounced for firms with higher marginal political 
cost. Analysts seem to find the percentage format 
easier to use and tend to make smaller errors in their 
ETR forecasts when firms present their ETR 
reconciliation in the percentage format.  
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Demeré, Li, 
Lisowsky, and 
Snyder (2019) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
 Firms  1,654  
- 2,269 
1996-
2012 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Does smoothing of GAAP 
ETRs via tax accruals affect 
financial reporting quality as 
measured by restatements and 
the ability of GAAP ETRs to 
predict future cash ETR?  
GAAP ETR smoothing is negatively associated with 
the likelihood of restatements, especially for 
fraudulent reporting cases and tax-related 
restatements. On average, a one standard deviation 
increase in GAAP ETR smoothing is associated with 
a decrease in the likelihood of having a tax-related 
(non-tax-related) restatement by 12.8 (6.8) percent 
conditional on the base likelihood. GAAP ETR 
smoothing is also associated with a decreased 
likelihood of tax-related fraud events by 47 percent 
conditional on the base likelihood.  
Dyreng, Hoopes, 
and Wilde (2016) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
Kingdom 
Firms 77 1997-
2012 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Does public scrutiny lead to 
changes in firms’ disclosure, 
corporate tax avoidance 
behavior and usage of 
subsidiaries in tax haven 
countries?  
Noncompliant firms increase their subsidiary 
disclosures immediately following the public 
pressure. Subsequent disclosures reveal 
disproportionately higher levels of tax haven usage 
compared to the previous incomplete disclosures. 
Following the public pressure period, there was a 2.7 
percentage point increase in the ETRs of 
noncompliant firms in the years following the initial 
public pressure to comply with the subsidiary 
disclosure law.  
Flagmeier and 
Müller (2019) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Firms 78 2005-
2014 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Do companies voluntarily 
disclose additional information 
on tax loss carryforwards if the 
recoverability is uncertain? 
Companies with greater ex ante uncertainty about the 
tax loss usability voluntarily disclose more and more 
salient information about tax loss carryforwards. 
Flagmeier, Müller, 
and Sureth-Sloane 
(2020) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
Germany Firms 70 2001-
2012 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
How and when do firms report 
information about the GAAP 
ETR if the ratio has a condition 
that is appreciated by investors? 
Firm with decreasing GAAP ETRs or GAAP ETRs 
close to their peers’ tend to disclose more GAAP ETR 
information and provide this information more 
visibly in their annual financial and management 
reports.  
Mills, Nutter, and 
Schwab (2013) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Firms 1,970 
firm-year 
observatio
ns 
2000-
2007 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Do politically sensitive con-
tractors pay higher taxes? Do 
firms with greater bargaining 
power incur fewer tax-related 
political costs than firms with 
lower bargaining power?  
Politically sensitive firms (federal contractors) report 
higher federal taxes. The relation between political 
sensitivity and tax costs decreases with a firm's 
bargaining power.  
 
Northcut and Vines 
(1998) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Firms 188 1981-
1985 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Does political scrutiny of 
corporate effective tax rates 
influence accounting policy 
choices?  
Firms marked as “corporate freeloaders” in public 
scrutiny by the Citizens for Tax Justice exhibit a 
positive association of average ETRs and changes in 
deferred tax expenses following the public pressure. 
Firms with low average ETRs use accounting choices 
and report higher average ETRs in the year prior to 
the upcoming tax reform (TRA 1986).  
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Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978) 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Firms  
 
 
53 
1972-
1974 
Theoretical 
Analysis 
 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Why are firms willing to spend 
resources to influence the 
determination of accounting 
standards? 
Higher (reported) ETRs can be both a result of 
political costs and a tool to bias the political process. 
Firms having contact with governments affect their 
future cashflows by discouraging government action 
through the reporting of lower net incomes. Firm size 
is found to be the most important factor explaining 
managerial voting behavior on General Price Level 
Accounting. 
Wong (1988) Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
 
New 
Zealand 
Firms 95 1984 Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
What are the effects of political 
and debt contracting costs on an 
intra-period accounting choice 
(accounting method choice for 
export tax credit)? 
The choice of accounting method is linked to a firm’s 
political costs. The results indicate that large firms 
adopt the “credit to sales” method when accounting 
for export tax credits to raise their tax rates to the level 
of comparable politically less sensitive firms and to 
minimize public scrutiny. 
Zimmerman (1983) Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
United 
States 
Firms 43,515 
firm-year 
observa-
tions 
1947-
1981 
Archival 
Data 
Analysis 
Whether and how are firm size, 
industry classification, and 
effective tax rates associated?  
The study reveals that ETRs are partial measures of 
the firm’s political costs. ETRs reflect managers’ 
choice of (income reducing) accounting procedures 
and in turn the inherent political costs. This study 
provides evidence on the association between firm 
size and political costs (higher government scrutiny 
and wealth transfers). Consistent with the political 
cost hypothesis, the largest firms have the highest 
ETR in most but not all industries. The strongest 
association between firm size and ETRs is in the oil 
industry following the 1969 Tax Act. 
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